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A. THE TOPIC AND SCOPE OF DISCUSSION
This thesis will examine the Soviet discussion in
the open press ot the issue o-f sea 1 ines of
communication (SLOC) interdiction. Its emphasis will be
on "discovery" in a chronological -framework— to examine
the major Soviet military Journals, draw -from them what
appear to be the signi-ficant contributions to the
subject o-f an t i -SLOC war -fare in the order o-f their
appearance, and through them to analyze the progress o-f
the an ti -SLOC debate. This study will be comparative
only in the internal sense; -for the sake o-f bounding the
volume o-f relevant i n -forma t i on
,
it will not incorporate
Western commentary to a significant degree, or contrast
the views o-f Western with Soviet writers on the problems
o-f ant i -SLOC war-fare, but will -focus solely upon the
development o-f the discussion appearing in unc 1 ass i -f i ed
m i 1 i tar >' J ournal s as or i g i nated by Sov i e t wr i ters .
In the West, the mission o-f SLOC protection has been
a primary concern to naval strategists -for yearsl. j p,
the Soviet Union, the s i gn i -f i cance and conduct o-f
an ti -SLOC operations has likewise been a prominent topic
among wr i ters in m i 1 i tary press , and it -features what
appears to be a considerable o-f disagreement among the
various contributors. However, it is not easy to
discern the salient -features o-f , and limitations on, the





tural environment. As noted by J. M.
McConne 1 1
,
The Russians express themselves in print 1 ike no other
people; without experience with their modes of
discussion a Western reader will simply -flounder...
Moscow implies; the reader h i mse 1 -f has to in-fer.2
A survey o-f Russian political culture as it relates
to the anti-SLOC debate is undertaken in section B
be 1 ow
.
The -first text to be considered in this study will
be S. G. Gorshkov's Sea Power o-f the State , which was
-first signed to press in November 1975. Follow-on
sources will be almost exclusively articles taken -from
Soviet Journals published subsequent to Sea Power o-f the
State . The majority will be translated articles -from
Naval Pi gest and Military-Historical Journal . The
last articles to be considered will be those o-f interest
-from what has become known as "The Theory o-f the Navy
Debate". That discussion was conducted in Naval Pi qest
during the years 1981-1983, and was concluded with a
summarizing article by Admiral Gorshkov . The Theory o-f
the Navy debate, as will be argued, appears to have its
genesis in the anti-SLOC debate; thus this examination
will commence with the single most comprehensive,
authoritative, and prominent public exposition o-f
8
concepts o-f Soviet seapower ^Mailable, will conclude
with equally authoritative summary remarks (probably
amounting to a statement o-f military doctrine), and will
center attention on the more recent developments o-f the
discussion, hopefully those o-f the greatest interest to
the pro-f ess i onal military audience, certainly those o-f
most interest to the author.
B. CULTURAL ASPECTS OF THE ANTI-SLOC DEBATE
Russian political culture (as described by
Keen an)—an amalgam o-f the peasantry, the bureaucracy,
and the princely court— is "in-formal, corporate,
conspiratorial, risk avoiding, guided by a pessimistic
view o-f man and a sense o-f the nearness o-f chaos. "3 j|-,g
continuity o-f these attributes was brie-fly interrupted
during the -first years o-f the Soviet regime, but
subsequently reasserted itsel-f, and they remain
conspicuous aspects o-f Soviet culture in the modern era.
Or, as stated by Keenan
,
In the increasingly stable Soviet society o-f recent
decades, a political culture based upon traditional
assumptions and a deep commitment to stability and
order has consolidated itself, both within the
leadership and in Russian society at large. 4
Russian/Soviet culture emphasizes the importance of
outward unity in dealings with the outside world; the
leading elites are careful to first, arrive at private
corporate consensus in pol icy-making, and second, to
keep pol icy disagreements behind c osed doors when
dealing with the outer world. (The Marxist-Leninist
precept o-f "democratic centralism" is particularly in
consonance with the traditional Russian values in this
regard). Explicit elite contention on policy issues
remains a confidential matter.
This has implications for understanding something o-f
the limits to legitimate contention on the anti-SLOC
issue. Cultural values mandate that, by comparison to
Western norms, homogeneity o-f op i n i on--c 1 eav i ng to the
collective policy--be a central tendency in public
exposition. Disagreements in print will be muted or
masked in Aesopian language.
To use a color- metaphor, open discussion o-f a
contentious issue in the Western military press
—
the
role and -future of large -deck aircraft carriers, for
examp 1 e5__j-Qy ] (-j ^^ said to feature bright polychromatic
bands of distinct hues. On the large-deck carrier
Issue, for example, several distinct schools of thought
have taken form over the past several years. The old
guard has held staunchly to past conventional
wisdom— that large nuclear-powered carriers are now and
will continue to be the most survivable and effective
general purpose instrument of the Navy for years to
come. A second distinct school , made prominent by
Senator Gary Hart, has argued for a "m i n i -carr i er
"
10
construction strategy. Still others maintain that
cruise missile technology has made any large sur-face
ship an expensive, <^ulnerable anachronism. The Soviet
publ ic debate on an t i -SLOC war-fare -features no such
distinct positions, but is made up o-f subtle
monochromatic shadings. To an outside observer-
accustomed to easily-distinguished colors, there could
appear to be scarcely any variation among di-f-ferent
points of view at all. Our purpose here is to
distinguish something o-f the varying shades o-f gray
within the larger gray-hued -field o-f the an t i -SLOC
debate--and variance among those shades o-f gray,
particularly that developing over time, is not easy to
discern. As McConnell notes.
Because the USSR does not explicitly repudiate its old
views, because it super-f i c i al 1 y seems to be saying the
same thing, with only slight changes in w or ding, one
is le-ft with the erroneous impression o-f continuity
rather than change.
6
As will become apparent, the Soviet ant i -SLOC debate
-flows in two di-f-ferent, but closely related paths. One
path is the continuing military-historical analysis o-f
the Great Patriotic War, i.e. what was the s i gn i -f i cance
o-f an ti -SLOC operations during the war? The historical
record and its assessment continue to comprise a K>ery
important element o-f the topic. The war record is a
rich source o-f data about SLOCs , e.g. the Allied
ship/tonnage losses -from German submarine attacks in the
11
North Atlantic; it is also used in a more normative way,
e.g. as an historical example o-f successful war-fighting
under the principles o-f Marxist-Leninist theory. As
will be seen, Soviet commentary on the Great Patriotic
War to some degree shi-fts in unison with changes in
opinion about the modern importance o-f anti-SLOC
war-f are ; Soviet commentary on historical matters dimly
re-flects the status o-f modern problems.
The second path o-f the debate examines the status o-f
current problems o-f naval strategy. Technology,
(particularly the "Revolution in Military A-f-fairs") and
soc i al -pol i t i cal trans-formations in the modern era have
brought about pro-found changes in naval operations,
particularly those related to the advent o-f nuclear
weapons, missile delivery systems, nuclear propulsion,
and -forms o-f troop con trol . Bu t
,
quite s i gn i -f i can 1 1 y
the resolution o-f modern problems -frequently entails
relating them to lessons o-f the Great vtriotic iar .
Two major patterns are to be seen among Soviet naval
writers dealing with current problems: 1) to emphasize
the s i gn i -f i cance o-f naval operations during the war, and
carry that lesson -forward to modern times, or, 2) to
argue that postwar developments have brought about a
state o-f a-f-fairs wherein the s i gn i -f i cance o+' naval
operations—anti-SLOC in particular—has grown beyond
12
what it was during the war, when the major adversary was
a continental power.
In any event, either technique— transposing the
lessons o-f the past war to the present, or emphasizing
the d i -f -f erences between the past and presen t--en ta i 1 s
coming to grips with the experience o-f the Great
Patriotic War. Several conventions shape Soviet
historiography dealing with the war. Those o-f greatest
concern here include:
1. The war was primarily a continental struggle; its
outcome was determined by the outcome o-f the land
camp a i gns
.
2. The de-feat o-f the Axis powers would have been
impossible without the decisive de-feat o-f the
Wehrmacht on the Eastern -front by the Armed Forces
o-f the Soviet Union.
3. Although all the Soviet Armed Forces cooperated
harmoniously in the national struggle, the Red
Army bore the brunt o-f the battle, and was the
primary instrument o-f victory.
The above canons tend to limit the possible
reassessment of the in-fluence o-f maritime -factors on the
outcome o-f the war. To magni-fy the importance o-f the
war's naval campaigns (or anti-SLOC operations in
particular) beyond the orthodox challenges the hierarchy
o-f belie-f which accords the Red Army the -foremost place
in de-feating -fascism. By implication it diminishes the
s i gn i -f i cance o-f the Red Army's land campaign; it also
raises another troublesome issue, in that it would tend
to enhance the importance o-f the war's major naval
campaigns (such as the Battle -for the Atlantic), most o-f
13
which were -fought exclusively by the Western allies.
Thus both the leading role o-f the Army among the Soviet
Armed Forces and the leading role o-f the Soviet Union
among the an t i --f asc i st coalition would be modi-fied.
Constraints on re-assessment o-f the historical
record are one type o-f limit, but there is another to be
considered as well — the limits which apply to the
examination o-f current problems. In the vertical
hierarchy o-f military thought, there comes a point at
which a given topic is no longer discussable— that point
being where, a-fter an adequate amount o-f debate has been
heard, a decision is made at a very senior level which
in e^^-fect "settles" the issue?, i^ ^h i s regard, a few
o-f-ficial de-finitions may be use-ful. From Sokol ovsky ' s
Soviet Military Thought
.
Soviet Military Science stud i es the conditions -for the
preparation and conduct o-f war depending on the
politics, socio-economic and other -factors, the laws
o-f armed struggle, and works out the methods and -forms
o-f war-fare ... 8
And -from the Soviet Military Encyclopedia,
Military Science..
. studi es war as a comp 1 ex
soc i o-pol i t i cal phenomenon . . . armed con-flict is the
basic subject o-f its research ...it is based upon
Marxist-Leninist teachings and the experience of
wars .
9
Again -from Soviet Military Thought , Military Doc tine
is "an expression o-f the accepted views o-f a state
regarding the problems o-f . . .war . " 1 d And, -from the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia,
14
Militairy Doctrine [ i s3 a system of views adop ted in a
state -for a given period o-f time on the objectives and
character o-f a possible war. 11
In other words, Military Science is a continuing
area o-f study, criticism, and discussion; it is the
activity during which the principles of Military
Doctrine are worked out, and is the result of a
dialectical process, wherein antagonistic concepts are
resolved. On the other hand, Military Doctrine is
official state policy, and as such passes beyond the
sphere of publ ic discussion. Open journals are not the
venue for critical assessment of such matters. The end
of disputation on a particular issue probably indicates
that the doctrinal decision has been made.
The texts to be considered then, in examining the
an t i -SLOG debate, will be products of a culture which
values group cohesion and the appearance of external
unity. Observance of this precept in the analysis of an
issue on which there is differing opinion will result in
its public discussion in masked forms and language not
analogous to that composing Western debates.
Orderliness is important, as is strict discipline in
recognizing and preserving orthodoxy, both in historical
analysis and in matters of current concern. Official
acts of repudiation or recantation of past "errors" are
extremely rare, as is criticism of superior members of
established hierarchies. Public disputation of a given
15
issue is allowed, (at times even encouraged), prior to
its o-f-ficial resolution, but is strictly enjoined
therea-f ter .
16
II . SEA POUIER OF THE STATE
A. COMMENTS ON METHODOLOGY
The text to be considered in this chapter, Sea Poiyjer
o-f the State by S. G. Gorshkov, as noted aboue , is an
apt starting point for reasons o-f comprehens- i ueness
and authority. Sea Pouier o-f the State combines an
interpretative review o-f modern Soviet naval history,
particularly that o-f the Great Patriotic War, and a
discussion o-f current problems o-f naval theory. This
book will be assessed under the two topics o-f: The
s i gn i -f i cance o-f anti-SLOC war-fare during the Great
Patriotic War, (abbreviated to simply "The Great
Patriotic War") and the s i gn i -f i cance o-f anti-SLOC
war-fare in the current day, (abbreviated to "Current
S i gn i -f i cance ") .
The process o-f assembl i ng what in ordinary terms
would be considered a un i -f i ed presentation of Gorshkov's
anti-SLOC commentary entails the winnowing out and
combining o-f widely separated sentences, paragraphs, and
sections, some o-f which are redundant. Some passages
are seem ingly explicit, others more obscure and
in-ferential. It is di-f-ficult to account -for the
"dispersion" o-f the anti-SLOC argument. Super-f i c i al 1 y it
would almost appear to be no more nor less than
inattentive editing; however, two speculative
17
possibilities suggest themselves. One is that the book
is in part a compendium o-f individually written articles
originally intended -for separate publication; the second
is that, by spacing out di-f-ferent components o-f his
anti-SLOC argument, Gorshkov would make it less
comprehensible and hence possibly controversial to the
non-Navy readership— the most 1 ikely source o-f
disagreement. He would nonetheless communicate his
message to those with the interest and patience to seek
it out --the attentive Navy audience.
B. THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
Gorshkov made clear in his introduction that the
role o-f the Soviet Army in winning victory was decisive.
Naval actions contributed to the outcome o-f the war but
did not determine it.
...the struggle in the sea and ocean theaters was a
struggle in secondary sectors whose in-fluence on the
course o-f the war as a whole, although considerable,
was not decisive. 12
The above excerpt is an ostensible example o-f
leading of-f a possibly disputatious thesis with a
conciliatory gesture: The Army was the most important.
However, as will be seen, Gorshkov made relatively light
o-f the Navy's suppor t-the--f 1 ank mission during the war.
According to Gorshkov, the Navy's contribution to the
war's outcome consisted o-f two di-f-ferent types o-f
missions: 1). Supporting the -flanks o-f the army, which
18
was the most important in the early days ot the war 13
J
(a significant 1 i mi tat i on— implying that the mission was
less important later), and 2). War at sea operations,
including the conduct o-f operations against enemy SLOCs.
The order in which Gorshkov 1 i sted the two missions in
one passage suggests an emphasis on the Navy's
importance as a unique instrument, with capabilities and
potential extending beyond the coastal -flanks o-f the
army :
Thus, the Soviet Navy had to simultaneously accomplish
two groups o-f missions during the war. First, we had
to wage war at sea with a strong enemy who was
stubbornly trying to seize the initiative and to
destroy our Navy. Second, our Navy was supposed to
stabilize the strategic -flanks o-f the -front and assist
the ground -forces on the de-fensive and the
of -f ens i ve . . . th i s was the only correct approach ... our
Navy showed itself to be an active and powerful force,
capable of dramatically changing the situation on the
sea and in the coastal zone...M
The "war at sea" mission was 1 isted ahead of the
"assist the ground forces" m i ss i on--suggest i ng a
priority or ordering of importance, and the capabilities
of the navy were 1 ikewise demonstrated first "on the
sea", and second "in the coastal zone". Neither, it
should be noted, are what the Ground Forces perspective
would probably mandate. As in the introduction,
Gorshkov reiterated traditional orthodox Navy
subordination (here to the need to fulfill the
suppor t-the-f 1 ank mission): "this was the only correct
approach". Yet, given the statement which preceded it.
19
the declaration appears incongruous, and more
ritualistic than sincere.
Operations at sea had a "marked in-fluence" on the
course o-f the uiar
,
and an t i -SLOC operations were the
most important naval activities; the battle -for the
Atlantic SLOCs in particular was o-f "strategic
si gn i -f i cance . " 15(; j ,e ^ ^ it had a direct in-fluence on the
outcome of the war). In the Atlantic, German commerce
raiding operations -failed to strangle England, but only
because the German High Command did not build or deploy
adequate numbers o-f submarines early in the war, did not
support them adequately with air reconnaissance, and
took no measures to protect their submarines -from Allied
ASW -forces. 1<^ With the commencement o-f Plan Barbarossa,
the German diversion of naval forces to the Eastern
Front made it impossible for them to strangle England.
W i th the i nvas i on
,
...the German submarines [in the North Atlantic] were
left to their own resources... The war against lines of
communications which linked Cthe USSR] with the Allies
heated up with great i n tens i ty . 1 '''
The Soviet Navy also contributed to the victory of
the Western allies in the battle for the Atlantic.
Through strikes against bases, sea lines of
communication, and enemy ships [the Soviet Navy] made
sizeable contribution in the battles with enemy
f 1 ee ts . . . dur i ng the most desperate period of the
"Battle for the Atlantic," about 207. of the total
[German submarine force] were in action on the Black,
Baltic, or Barents sea. The enemy air force [in
20
Russia] was greatly reinforced during periods o-f
bi t ter -f i gh t i ng . . . 1 8
Gorshkov's characterization of the relationship
between So^^iet Nauy operations and the Battle for the
Atlantic emphasized an indirect influence of the former
on the latter; by his assessment, the Soviet Navy
garnered a measure of credit for the failure of the
German an t i -SLOC campaign.
Soviet ant i -SLOC operations against the Germans
also had a "substantial effect on the combat capability
of the enemy forces. "19 Qorshkov made repeated
references to heavy German shipping losses from Soviet
attacks; however, only one German defeat--that of
Rommel in North Africa—was "predestined" by the success
of ant i -SLOC warfare, this by the British efforts in the
Medi terranean.20
It is uncertain why Gorshkov calls Rommel's defeat
in North Africa "predestined" by ant i -SLOC action;
however, one possibility is that because the Afrika
Corps was a K>ery small German contingent (by Eastern
Front standards) and was defeated in the course of
relatively distant and unimportant campaign (from the
Soviet perspective), that any Soviet commentary would be
less bound by the canons of Great Patriotic War
historiography noted in Chapter I. Moreover, the Red




hence it would be no diminution o-f its status
to ascribe Rommel's de-feat to naval action.
In the case o-f Great Britain, a nation whose
capacity "not only to continue the war but to survive "21
depended upon maintaining SLOCs, the role o-f the navy
(as protector o-f SLOCs) was critical to its survival,
according to Gorshkov. For the duration o-f the war, the
Western allies were -forced to allocate major resources
to SLOC-protec t i on operations.
In the Pac i -f i c
,
an oceanic theater, naval operations
had a more substantial e-f-fect on the course o-f the
campaign than was the case in the Atlantic. The two
main naval belligerents—Japan and the United
States--each conducted quite di-f-ferent SLOC-re 1 ated
operations. Japan devoted almost no attention to either
SLGC attack or de-fense, choosing instead to commit its
submarines to operations against naval combatants. The
lack of balance in the forces and missions o-f the
Japanese navy, in particular its failure to provide for
SLOG defense, was one of the reasons for its defeat. 22
By contrast, the U.S. gradually built a balanced naval
force and devoted considerable attention to attacking
merchant shipping, mostly by means of submarines, which
were also quite effective against Japanese naval forces.
Thus Japan's military and economic strength was sub-
stantially reduced, while that of the U.S. grew
22
unimpeded. 23 <Gorshkov cleaves to the o-f-ficial Soviet
view, though, in noting that Japan's capitulation was
brought about only by the Soviet Army's victory over the
Kuiangtung Army in Manchuria).
It will be seen in -future articles that a central
issue in the process o-f the an t i -SLOC debate will be the
problem of identifying, first in historical and then in
theoretical terms, the influence of anti-SLOC operations
on the course of the continental campaign. Recitation
of tonnage losses due to anti-SLOC actions were a
prominent element of Gorshkov's presentation, and would
continue to be a preferred argument in future
discussions. The effects of those losses, however, and
the best strategy for optimizing the effects of losses,
were not developed at this early stage of the
di scuss i on
.
C. CURRENT SIGNIFICANCE
According to Gorshkov , the postwar evolution of the
international system has resulted in a situation in
which the Soviet Union faces a different threat than was
the case during the war, a threat not merely from a
strong continental power.
Today... we are threatened by a coalition of sea
powers, which along with land armies, air forces, and
missile troops also have powerful modern naval forces
at their d i sposal .
23
The role ot combat in the ocean sec tors .. .has
increased greatly and under certain conditions these
sectors could become the main sectors. 24
Here, as noted abo«^e , Gorshkoy implicitly identi-fied
the limits of applicability o-f lessons o-f the Great
Patriotic War. Whereas Nazi Germany was a continental
power which could only be de-feated in a continental
campaign, -Future enemies are sea powers, wherein naval
combat operations will take on a new significance.
In Chapter One, Gorshk--- discussed in some detail
the modern importance of ocean commerce, particularly to
the economies of the developed nations of the West. The
rou tes al ong wh i ch sea traf f i c is rou ted are vital, in
both military and econom ic terms, particularly in the
Atl ant i c
.
The role of the Atlantic lines of communications
is increasing due to the exceptional military
importance of the theater .. .The main NATO
commun i cat i ons routes are of enormous mi 1 i tary
i mpor tance . . .The main transport arteries of the
Western countries run across the Atlantic Ocean, and
their economies depend greatly upon the uninterrupted
functioning of these arteries. 25
The Pacific and Indian Ocean basins received less
attention, but the economic and military roles of SLOCs
are noted in those areas as well.
Gorshkov's approach to assessing the current
significance of SLOCs was to note the transformation in
the potential military-economic signficance of anti-SLOC
since the war— to implicitly compare the vulnerabilities
o-f today's adversaries with yesterday's allies. England
was almost defeated by the -flawed German anti-SLOC
campaign—and the Atlantic SLOCs are more vital now than
they were then. Gorshkov does not categorically assert
that the ocean theaters will be more important than they
have been, but that they "could" be; the conditions
under which SLOCs will become o-f main importance seems
to be closely related with a scenario wherein the
economic power o-f the adversaries are brought to
bear— i.e., probably in an extended war scenario.
Modern naval -forces, submarines and aircra-ft in
particular, have important capabilities in anti-SLOC
operations. In the modern era, naval aircra-ft have been
relieved o-f their trad i t i onal pr i mary m i ss i on o-f
attacking -fixed targets;
Today they can direct their main ef-forts against
strike -forces o-f sur-face ships, and submarines and
transports, including those with troops and cargo in
transit or in port. 26
The above passage, while discussing capab i 1 i t i es
rather than m i ss i ons , does imply that anti-SLOC
operations would be part o-f the "main e-f-forts" o-f naval
av i at i on
.
In another section, nuc 1 ear -powered submarines with
cruise missiles and naval missile-armed aircra-ft were
speci-fically included with ballistic missile submar i nes
as occupying the "leading position" among naval -forces
25
due to their importance in conducting strategic missions
against the military-economic potential o-f the enemy27^
(The wording o-f the passage is ambiguous; an alternate
interpretation is that Gorshkov is re-ferring to
submarine and naval air units with coastal -at tack
capab i 1 i t i es) .
Under modern conditions, said Gorshkoy, the main
goal of the Navy s to support missions related to
operations against enemy land targets and to protect
against strikes -from the sea. 28 Naval combat operations
were divided into categories of "Fleet Against Fleet"
and "Fleet Against the Shore"; the former was
characterized as "involving the destruction of enemy
ships at sea and in bases and the battle for sea and
ocean communications (interdiction and defense). "^9 j^^
latter included such activities as amphibious assaults,
naval gunfire, air strikes by naval aircraft, and
missile strikes from submarines. Due to the security
and striking power of modern nuclear missile-armed
submarines, the importance of "Fleet Against the Shore"
operations is increasing, and so too is the role of
those "Fleet Against Fleet" operations wh i ch are
associated with the poals of "Fleet Aoainst the Shore
ope rat i ons
.
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the significance of. ..such traditional missions as
interdicting the sea communications of the enemy...
has changed. These operations are now a most
26
important integral part o-f naval e-f-forts aimed at
undermining the military-economic potential o-f the
enemy. ..The traditional f 1 ee t-aga i nst--f 1 ee t
operations, which since ancient times haue been
characteristic o-f the battle -for sea communications...
are being employed today in a new, decisive area--in
naval actions against the shore. 31
The above passage occurred in a segment devoted to
di scuss i ng the capab i 1 i ty o-f nuc 1 ear -m i ss i 1 e armed sub-
marines to strike the enemy's vital military-economic
targets -from the sea. The category o-f operations
against the shore included activities related to attac-
king the military-economic potential o-f the enemy; anti-
SLOC operations, it would appear, were being subsumed
under that category, and hence with "the main goal o-f
the Navy" . And,
operations o-f naval -forces aimed at crushing the
military-economic potential o-f the enemy... can have a
direct in-fluence on the course and even the outcome o-f
a war . 32
The above passage clearly links nuclear-missile
strikes -from SSBNs to operations aimed at crushing the
military-economic potential o-f the enemy; i -f anti-SLOC
operations are also included in that category, as it
appears they are, then it would -follow that Gorshkov is
arguing, in a somewhat circuitous -fashion, that
anti-SLOC "can have a direct in-fluence on the course and
even the outcome o-f a war".
According to Gorshkov, the most important
consequence o-f establ i sh i ng control o-f the sea is that
27
it permits the ^'ictor to conduct -f ol 1 owup operations o-f
his own choosing in the a-f-fected area; his -first example
o-f such a -f ol 1 owup action was that o-f blockading the
enemy's ports, bases, and coastal sectors (an important
type o-f an t i -SLOC action). In the past, loss o-f sea
control could mean losing the war i -f one side was highly
dependent upon sea communications. A citation from a
nineteenth-century Russian naval textbook -further
rein-forces the traditional correctness o-f this m I ew . 33
SLOCs were vital to the U.S. in its conduct o-f the
k/'ietnam War. Blockades were enforced against both the
revolutionary -forces in the south and the DRk/* , and
uninterrupted sea transport was central to sustaining
the U.S. war ef-fort.
Military sea transport in local wars has played a
highly important and at times decisive role. ..Ocean
and sea shipments were also o-f very great importance
in the 'v'ietnam war . 34
The -final re-ference to SLOCs in Sea Power o-f the
State is -found in the -first o-f the author's conclusions,
wh i ch says
In examining the change in missions being
prosecuted by navies -from an historical point o-f view,
we cannot -fail to note that the "oldest" o-f them,
which retains its importance even under present-day
conditions, is the battle against sea
c ommu n i c a t i on s . . .35
D. SUMMARY
Gorshkov's message in Sea Power o-f the State
sustained, with care-ful quali-fications, the traditional
28
orthodox view o-f who won the Great Patriotic War (the
Army) and why (because Germany was a continental power).
Most s i gn i -f i can t
,
however, were his evaluations o-f the
overall importance o-f the Navy's suppor t-the--f 1 anks
mission, and what lessons ought to be derived from the
record o-f World War I I as a whole. Support -for the
flanks was most important during the early days of the
war
.
As the fighting on the eastern front progressed,
the importance of the more oceanic missions overshadowed
that of coastal operations; an t i -SLOC operations, the
"principal type" of operation, had a "substantial"
effect on the course of the fighting. In the oceanic
theaters, where nations dependent on SLOCs were
engaged, an ti -SLOC operations had "strategic
significance", and defeat or victory was directly
related to the outcome of the an t i -SLOC campaign. The
outcome of the ant i -SLOC campaign was due as much to
German failures as it was to Allied successes.
Gorshkov's assessment of the modern situation
strongly implies basic continuities between the
situations faced by the Western alliance then and now.
In the modern age, the NATO alliance finds itself in a
situation similar, but ominously more vulnerable than
that which many of its members faced during World War
II; SLOCs are militarily and economically more vital
than ever, the Soviet Union has learned from the
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mistakes o-f the German anti-SLOC campaign, and the
capabilities o-f modern anti-SLOC weapons are vastly
greater than was the case during World War II. The
Navy's capability to deliver crushing strikes against
the shore has greatly expanded and become increasingly
important, not only in terms o-f nuclear-missile weapons,
but also in terms o-f operations in a new, decisive
area
—
anti-SLOC operations—which have now become part
o-f the main mission o-f the Navy. Postwar history bears
out the lesson that SLOCs continue to be vital in the
conduct o-f imperialist wars. The trans-formation o-f
a-f -fairs since World War II has not diminished the
importance o-f anti-SLOC operations, but rather, has
i ncr eased them
.
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III. THE ANTI-SLQC DEBATE 1976-1978
A. THE HEYDAY OF THE DEBATE
In terms o-f sheer numbers of articles, the years
1976 through 1978 are the heyday o-f the anti-SLOC debate
within the period covered by this thesis. During this
three-year period, the average number o-f articles
deal ing with either war t i me an t i -SLOC opera t i ons or
current anti-SLOC operations is more than twice that
-found in subsequent years. Central issues which came to
characterize major points o-f view within the debate
would sur-f ace--represen tat i ves o-f what will be called
the "progressive" and "conservative" positions will come
-forth; the dichotomy between those who argued -for an
oceanic anti-SLOC campaign o-f and coastal blockade
anti-SLOC would become apparent. Radical revisions in
GorshkoVs assessment o-f anti-SLOC would appear, and two
hallmark articles by Uice Admiral Stalbo would set the
stage -for a comprehensive review o-f the whole status and
method o-f j ust i -f i cat i on -for the anti-SLOC mission.
B. 1976 PROGRESSIVES AND C0N3ERUATIUES
During the year 1976, something appeared o-f the
divisions which separate various -factions o-f the
anti-SLOC debate. Those who will be assigned the
ascription "progressive" within the context o-f this
topic tend to make statements which emphasize the
31
importance o-F the Soviet Navy's anti-SLOC mission during
the war, the successes rather than the -failures o-f the
German anti-SLOC campaign, the growing economic and
military dependence o-f NATO upon SLOCs, and the voiced
concerns o-f the NATO military leadership -for their
security. The "conservative" camp, on the other hand,
tends to emphasize the Navy's suppor t-the--f 1 anks mission
during the war and care-fully quali-fies the importance o-f
anti-SLOC war-fare both during the war and in the modern
era. In general it could be said that the "conserva-
tive" view probably comes closer to a Ground Forces
point o-f view on the uses and potential o-f naval -forces.
In January 1976, Captain 1st Rank 'v'orov'yev cited
the important contribution o-f sur-face ships in anti-
SLOC operations against German -forces:
Inter -ference with the sea communications o-f the enemy
was one o-f the most important missions o-f the Soviet
Navy. The main role in its accomplishment was played
by aircra-ft and submar i nes . . . th i s mission was assigned
regularly [only] to motor torpedo boats and Ceven]
occasionally Conly] to patrol cra-ft, minesweepers, and
destroyers .. .The destroyers o-f the Black Sea Fleet
were the most active on communications, carrying out
36 sorties with mission assignments to search out and
destroy convoys at sea and to shell ports. 36
'v'orov'yev also maintained that the experiences o-f
the Great Patriotic Ular continue to be relevant in
assessing the capabilities o-f modern sur-face combatants.
Thus, the experience o-f the Great Patriotic War
testi-fies to the mu 1 t i --face ted activity o-f sur-face
combatant ships. They -found extensive employment -for
gun-fire support o-f the Ground Forces, in
coun ter-C shore ] battery -fire, -for putting amphibious
landings ashore in de-fense o-f our own sea
communications, and -for interference with the sea
communications o-f the enemy... The experience o-f the
combat employment o-f sur-face ships in the years o-f the
Great Patriotic War has not lost its relevance even
-for our t i mes . 37
^^orov''yev ranked the wartime anti-SLOC operations as
"one o-f the most important," but not the "principal
type" o-f naval activity, as did Gorshkov— a subtle
downgrading. He also ranks the support-the- flanks
mission ahead o-f anti-SLOC in the context o-f sur-face
ship employment. The principal contributions of surface
craft were in mission areas other than anti-SLOC
operations (which is listed in last place); the
pre-eminence of aircraft and submarines in anti-SLOC is
acknowledged. ^oroVyev may be making a restrained bid
to propose the continued valuable contribution of
surface warships in a major mission area which has been
largely assigned to other naval branches.
k/iorov ' yev ' s major thesis— that surface ships had
significant contributions to make in anti-SLOC
operations—never reappears in the anti-SLOC debate.
The absence of subsequent repetition or approving
reference suggests that his point of view found no
adherents, and that submarine and air forces continued
to be regarded as the virtually exclusive weapons of
anti-SLOC operations.
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In the April 1976 issue o-f Naval Digest , Fleet
Admiral Lobov reviewed the recently published Seapower
o-f the State . Though his remarks did not spec i -f i cal 1 y
address the SLOC-related points raised by Gorshkov, one
passage in particular i mp 1 i es shared appreciation -for
the importance o-f SLOCs during the war, though in this
case the subject is Soviet SLOCs:
The work o-f the Commander in Ch i e-f o-f the Navy points
to the great contributions o-f the crews o-f the
merchant ships in the pursuit o-f victory, where in
many cases the sea 1 i nes o-f communications were the
main and sometimes the only routes -for del ivering
military supplies. 38
In the next issue o-f Naval D i gest . Captains 1st Rank
Morozov and Krivinsky also used the experience o-f the
Great Patriotic Uar to relate an t i -SLOC actions to the
outcome o-f war on the continental theaters. The interest
o-f their article bears out a considerable excerpt:
...o-f considerable interest is study o-f the experience
o-f the Second World War in war -fare on sea
communications and the possibilities o-f employing it
under contemporary cond i t i ons . . .The disruption o-f
maritime communications, which o-f ten were the only way
o-f getting suppl ies and support to the Ground Forces,
exerted considerable in-fluence on the course o-f combat
operations on the land -fronts, and also damaged the
economy o-f the opposing states .. .Today the growing
combat capabilities o-f our Navy... make it -feasible to
assign more decisive aims to war-fare on
commun i cat i ons . . . A study o-f the experience o-f war-fare
on oceanic and sea communications in the years o-f the
Second World War with account taken o-f the changes in
the composition and armament o-f navies during the
postwar period would -facilitate a deeper and more
correct resolution o-f the questions o-f naval art under
modern c i rcumstances . 39
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MorozoM and Kriyinsky used language very similar to
that employed by Gorshkov; e.g., anti-SLOC operations
exerted a "considerable in-fluence" on the course o-f
combat operations on the ground -fronts; anti-SLOC
warfare under modern conditions can be of more
"decisive" significance. Of most interest, however, is
their final statemen t-- i mp 1 y i ng that the lessons of the
naval actions of the Great Patriotic Uar have yet to be
correctly incorporated into current views on naval art,
i.e., that the importance of anti-SLOC operations is not
yet fully appreciated. In Soviet parlance, to publicly
announce that a "more correct resolution" of a
particular issue is called for amounts to criticism of a
degree rarely encountered; the authors appear to be
saying that the lessons of the Great Patriotic War and
the models of action drawn therefrom may be exerting too
great an influence on the resolution of modern problems
of naval ar t
.
The anti-SLOC issue was to surface briefly once
again in 1976 above Gorshkov's signature in the article
entitled "Navy" in the current edition of the Sov i e t
Military Encyc 1 oped i a . 40 j^.,^ Navy CINC listed the
capabilities of the modern navy, placing anti-SLOC
operations behind strategic nuclear strikes and attacks
against naval forces, but ahead of aid to the ground
forces, amphibious operations, and transportation.
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The o-f-ficial character o-f the Sqm i e t Mi 1 i tar y
Encyc 1 oped i a suggests the conclusion that there was wide
agreement that in modern times, an t i -SLOC operations
were o-f greater importance than suppor t-the- -flanks
operat i ons
.
Several subsequent articles ranked Great Patriotic
War ant i -SLOC operations second in s i gn i -f i cance behind
suppor t--for-the-army type missions. For instance, an
editorial written in Communist of the Armed Forces -for
Navy Day stated
In the Great Patriotic War . .
.
the Navy secured the
stability o-f the strategic seaward -flanks o-f the huge
front, rel i abl y in-fl icted power-ful strikes on enemy
communications, de-fended our own merchant shipping,
and cooperated closely with the other services o-f the
Armed Forces. 41
An editorial o-f almost exactly the same wording
appeared the same month (July) in Naval Pi qest ^^ ; the
timing and near- i den t i ty in wording appearing in two
major armed -forces Journals suggests that both pieces
could have been originated by a single higher authority.
Military press articles published -for Navy Day
emphasize, among other topics, traditional interpre-
tations o-f the Great Patriotic War and themes o-f the
unity o-f the Armed Forces with each other and with the
Communist Party and the Soviet People. Historical
interpretations presented in major journals during this
time can be taken as reliable indicators of prevailing
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orthodox opinion. It would appear that some themes
expressed by Gorshkov h I mse 1 -f in Sea Pouier o-f the State
are somewhat contrary to the canons ot military history,
particularly those which impute a greater importance to
the Sok^ i e t Navy's wartime an t i -SLOC operations than to
its suppor t-the--f 1 anks operations. Moreover, the
Morozov-Kr i V i nsky article, which may have been inspired
by Sea Power o-f the State . had gone even -further by
imp lying that current military science was de-ficient in
its evaluation o-f the s i gn i -f i cance o-f ant i -SLOC
operat i ons
.
An article by Fleet Admiral Srriirnov in Red Star o-f
late July also expressed a somewhat unconventional
assessment o-f the importance o-f wartime Soviet Navy
anti-SLOC, which he lists third behind anti-naval and
support-the-flanks operat i ons . 43 j^e same month, Rear
Admiral Stalbo noted the importance of SLOCs to the
e-f-fective prosecution o-f the local wars o-f aggression so
o-ften engendered by the United States:
Sea shipments had especially great importance in the
wars in Korea and ^Jietnam. . . The dependence o-f
military operations on -functioning o-f sea shipments is
apparen t . '^'^
Stalbo's observation, which echoes a similar remark
by Gorshkov in Sea Power of the State , indicates not
only that postwar history is being scrutinized for
lessons appl i cable to modern war, but that SLOCs, and by
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implication an t i -SLOC war-fare, are vital to more than
one type o-f war .
In August, Karpov noted, and documented extensively,
the increasing economic importance o-f world ocean
shipping. His study, a good example o-f a type
•frequently found in Naval D i pest . concentrates on the
•flow o-f goods between the industrialized nations o-f the
West and their trading partners (the North Atlantic
routes in particular) and the growing importance o-f oil
transshipment routes. In worldwide terms, there has
been a "sharp rise in the strategic s i gn i -f i cance o-f the
merchant -fleet. "45 j^q -frequency and regularity o-f
articles in Naval D i qest which concentrate on the volume
and pattern o-f world oceanic shipping would seem to be a
telling indicator of the always-current Interest among
the editors and audience of being aware of the
importance of SLOCs to much of the rest of the world.
If arguments for an increased appreciation of the
strategic value of anti-SLOC operations (such as those
of Morozov-Kr i V i nsky) could be described as
"progressive", then Admiral Sysoyev's December article
was an expression of a "conservative" position.
According to Sysoyev , the importance of sea blockade has
grown with the advance of weapons technology and the
increase in oceanic trade; however, to accord a primary
strategic role to naval forces generally and blockading
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actions in particular he dismissed as a "bourgeois
error" associated with Mahan and Col omb--thus strongly
admonishing the "progressive" camp for basic theoretical
errors in analyzing problems o-f naval art.
According to Sysoyeu, the experience o-f the Second
Uor 1 d War bears out the proposition that sea blockade
does "-facilitate substantially" the achievement o-f the
larger tasks con-fronting the armed -forces as a whole.
Blockade is best employed
when the -forces and means -for the prompt destruc- t i on
o-f the adversary is 1 ack i ng . . . and above all to
undermine the military-economic capacity o-f a country
and to deprive it o-f -freedom o-f action in speci-fied
regions o-f the ocean (seas)... it cannot be excluded
that in the -future Canti-SLOC war-fare] may occupy an
important place in war-fare at sea and take the -form o-f
blockade or counter- blockade as it did in the Second
Wor 1 d War .46
SysoyeVs conservative position eschewed the
Navy-separatist style which had crept into the SLOC
discussion to date. He emphasized the continued
relevance o-f the lessons o-f the Great Patriotic War,
rather than the trans-formations which have taken place
since then. An t i -SLOC operations "-facilitate" broader
goals rather than take on individual "strategic
s i gn i -f i cance . " The ascription o-f excessive importance to
the role o-f the Navy was denounced in ideological
terms
—
success-ful operations are the result of
cooperation among all the Armed Forces.
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The conditions wherein anti-SLOC operations will be
most important were carefully limited (to an extended-
war scenario); its future significance commensurate with
that of the Great Patriotic War is possible, according
to Sysoyev , but is by no means certain. The proposi-
tions for anti-SLOC operations were associated with past
communal triumphs, and did not challenge the role and
status of the Ground Forces by criticism of tradi-
t i onal be 1 i ef s
.
C. 1977 CONSER'v'ATI'v'E REACTION
Two major characteristics of the anti-SLOC debate to
appear during 1977 suggest General Staff level
skepticism about the importance currently being accorded
to anti-SLOC operations by the "progressive" faction:
1) The Stalbo articles, discussed immediately below,
which call for a thorough military-historical
investigation into the influence of anti-SLOC on the
ground campaign; and 2) GorshkoVs retreat from the
high-priority status which he had previously accorded to
anti-SLOC warfare in Sea Power of the State and during
his several articles in 1976. The Stalbo articles, and
the subsequent compliance shown them, demonstrated a
real dearth of justification for the anti-SLOC mission
within the context of current strategy; the Gorshkov
retreat demonstrated high level (General Staff)
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opposition to the Na^^y's advocacy. (No lower authority
would be compelling).
The -First and probably the most si gni-f leant
contributions -for the year came -from Uice Adrriiral Stalbo
in the February and March issues o-f Naval D i oest . In
them, he explicated the di-f-ficult and complex problems
o-f naval history, and admonished the audience to be
alert -for new -formulations which could be arrived at
through creative use o-f naval theory and the historical
record. For instance, according to Stalbo, the results
o-f intensive research demonstrate that, in terms o-f
distribution o-f ship losses, coastal anti-SLOC
operations are more e-f-fective than those conducted on
the h i gh seas
:
In the course o-f one research study to determine...
the areas o-f losses o-f German ships, Cit was
determined that] the Hitlerites su-f-fered practically
all their losses in a narrow coastal be 1 t . . . i n another
study about losses in all ocean theaters it was
established that even there the Americans, English,
Japanese, and Germans also su-f-fered their main losses
in coastal areas. 47
According to Stalbo, considerable work has been done
in the historical study o-f navies in the Great Patriotic
War, but increased study o-f the relationship between
anti-SLOC operations and its e-f-fect on operations on
the ground -front is necessary.
Research in this area up to the present time has been
limited to tactics, their e-f-fectiveness, to
determination o-f the total tonnage destroyed per year,
-for periods o-f a war, or by theaters. Yet, not one o-f
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these works has considered the in-fluence o-f war -fare on
sea commun i cat i ons . . . on the ground front... it is
necessary to determine in what manner damaging an
adversary at sea af-fects the combat capabilities o-f
his armed -forces. 48
An adequate study o-f the necessary issues will de-fer
resolution o-f the place o-f an t i -SLOC warfare for some
t i me to come
:
Accompl ishment of [these] tasks in the area of naval
history [will] require many years of intensive work by
a considerable number of scholars. For this, new
directions in research must be taken which have no
prototypes as yet. Among them are the influence of
warfare on sea and oceanic communications on combat
action on the land. 49
Stalbo's articles were both an admonishment to
anti-SLOC "progressives" and a gesture of conciliation
to the probably numerous and powerful adherents of the
traditional "conservative" position. According to
Stalbo, the "progressives" had further work to do;
current levels of research and theory were inadequate.
Tonnage figures were inadequate Justification for
anti-SLOC campaigns; it was necessary to clearly
demonstrate what influence merchant tonnage losses had
on the course of the ground campaign, which remains the
dec i s i ve arena
.
As will become clear in Chapter U, the pair of
articles outlined above parallel in form and content the
pair of articles which were published almost five years
later. In April and May of 1981, Stalbo would again
call for an analytical effort, this time to elucidate
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the relationship between a Theory o-f the Na^^y and
military science as a whole. In 1977, Stalbo de-fined
and set a new approach to the evaluation o-f the
si gn i -f i cance o-f anti-SLOC war-fare. In 1981, he would
de-fine and set a new approach to ek^aluating the position
and relationship o-f the Na^^y relative to the rest o-f the
Armed Forces.
Three months later, in June, Red Star carried an
article by Captain 1st Rank ^^'yunenko which credited
coastal artillery with valuable contributions to inshore
anti-SLOC and blockading operations during the war.
"Although war -fare on enemy communications was not a main
ass
i
gnmen t . . . i t cost the enemy enormous losses. "50
'v'' yunenko' s thesis -follows in the train o-f, and is
rendered more plausible by, Stalbo's evaluation o-f
coastal anti-SLOC noted above.
U'yunenko reappeared in September with an article
which, in examining Joint naval and ground -force
operations during the Great Patriotic War, took account
o-f the practical consequences o-f the Soviet anti-SLOC
campaign in a way which demonstrated the in-fluence o-f
Stalbo's recent dictum:
Destruction o-f transport prevented the enemy -from
committing tens o-f thousands o-f soldiers to battle and
deprived him o-f -fuel, ammunition, and rat i ons ... thanks
to this, dozens o-f divisions, thousands o-f tanks,
guns, and ai rcr a-ft, and hundreds and thousands o-f tons
o-f ammun i t i on . . . cou 1 d not be used by the enemy. 51
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U'yunenko's approach takes the line proposed by
Stalbo above: To analyze the anti-SLOC issue in terms o-f
its contribution to operations on the ground -front. The
ethos—harmonious cooperation, and the goal --the
achievement o-f strategic victory on the continental
front, remain the same; but the type o-f naval operation
which best support it lies -further to seaward than has
been traditionally believed.
Admiral Gorshkov reentered the discussion in July.
In his hardcover book The Navy , the -following list
appears in a paragraph devoted to discussion o-f "the
strategic and operational missions" o-f the modern Navy:
(1) Hit the important ground objectives o-f an
adversary
;
(2) Destroy his -forces at sea and at their bases;
(3) Support the ground -forces, mainly with amphibious
landings and by cutting o-f-f the amphibious
landings o-f the adversary;
<4) Inter -fere with the oceanic and sea communications
o-f an enemy;
(5) Protect one's own [sea 1 i nes o-f communica-
tions] . 52
The low ranking accorded to anti-SLOC is noteworthy
-for several reasons. Firstly, it is quite at variance
with the importance he accorded to it in Sea Power o-f
the State
. and with that he accorded to it as recently
as July 1976. In comparing his July 1976 entry in the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia with the citation above, it
should be distinguished that the earlier quote is in
re-fere nee to the Navy's capabilities, the later quote to
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its missions. The -first two items on the list are the
same in each source; however, an t i -SLOC is listed third
as a capability in the Encyc 1 oped i a , and -fourth (behind
amphibious operations) as a mission in The Nak;y . The
di-f-ference in anti-SLOC ranking for the two categories
is not clear, but could be a way -for Gorshkov to
communicate a point of ^^ i ew that there was presently an
asymmetry between current Navy capabilities and current
Navy mission assignments— that the Navy had a powerful
anti-SLOC capability which was not being accorded proper
priority in military strategy. He does, however,
reiterate the scheme of subsuming anti-SLOC to the
undermining of the military-economic potential of the
enemy, and thus retains it as part of "the main mission
of a modern navy" as had been set forth earl i er in Sea
Power of the State . 53
Ulhy, though, would Navy capabilities to conduct
anti-SLOC be unduly restrained by the General Staff
planners? One possibility is that suggested by the
earlier appearance of the February-March Stalbo
articles— that the "conservative" Ground Forces-
dominated General Staff was not convinced that anti-SLOC
operations were as important an element in current
strategy as many Navy "progressives" were
—
hence the
need for Navy writers to fully develop the relationship
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between anti-SLOC operations and combat on the ground
•fronts.
Gorshkov addressed the anti-SLOC issue twice more in
print be-fore the year was out. In October in Mi 1 i tary-
Historical Journal he reviewed the Navy's operations
during the war. "The first and main group Co-f missions]
i nc 1 uded ... ass I stance to the... Red Army which was
carrying the main burden of the war . " 54 Again his
listing of Navy wartime missions is anomalous by
comparison to earl i er formulations; anti-SLOC is 1 i sted
behind operations against German naval combatants and
aircraft, and surface ship raids against German ports
and bases, but listed ahead of SLOC defense, flank
support against the German navy, and blockade of German
forces pinned to the seacoast . In the November Naval
D i qest , he emphasized that, during the war, naval
operations were carefully coordinated with the
requirements of the main theater. During the first phase
of the war (prior to the German defeat at Stalingrad),
support of the army's flanks was paramount; during the
second phase, the Navy's role expanded to include other
significant missions, including anti-SLOC; (that aspect
at least is consistent with the view he put forth in Sea
Power of the State ). Throughout the war,
...missions were dictated by requirements of the armed
conflicts at the fronts... the use of the navy's forces
was determined by the need for coordination...
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primarily in the interest o-f routing the main enemy
•forces on 1 and. 55
In the modern age, with the development o-f an
oceanic missile navy, enemy SLOCs would be endangered
wor 1 dw i de
.
Gone into obi ivion are the hopes o-f strategists across
the seas and elsewhere that... their sea communications
and shores would be inaccessible to our strikes. 56
I -f anything was certain in the Gorshkov articles
about the priority status o-f anti-SLGC operations,
historical or modern, it was that they communicated
varied messages over a short period o-f time, and that
the messages in general summed to the conclusion that
the importance o-f an ti -SLOG relative to other naval
missions had not been establ ished; there may have been
scant General Sta-f -f-l eve 1 consensus as to how best to
use the Navy's non-nuclear-missile armed -forces to best
advantage within the context o-f current strategy.
D. 1978 GORSHKOU RETRENCHMENT
During 1978, Gorshkov made no remark upon anti-SLOC
operations up until almost the end o-f the year; his
pronouncements emphasized the theme o-f Navy unity with
the other Armed Forces almost to the exclusion o-f all
else. The most "progressive" anti-SLOC arguments were
being made by relatively junior o-f-ficers, and -frequently
through the rhetorical device o+' quoting appropriate
excerpts -from Western military authorities; no open
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assertions -for a high-priority an t i -SLOC missions were
made. By late in the year, it appeared that Gorshkov
was again able to rank ant i -SLOC as -far up as second on
the list o-f wartime Navy missions, perhaps signalling
that the "progressives" were gaining ground in
just i -f i cat i on -for a high-priority an t i -SLOC campaign.
Admirals Gorshkov and Smirnov repeated the theme o-f Navy
cooperation with the Armed Forces twice in the early
months o-f 1973. Gorshkov wrote in the February Mi 1 i tary
Herald
.
Per -forming their assigned combat missions during the
war, navymen ensured the stability o-f our Ground
Forces' coastal
-f 1 anks . . . the Navy per-formed its
missions in close coordination with other services o-f
the Armed Forces and with other combat arms o-f the
serv i ces .. .There was particularly close coordination
between the Navy and the Ground Forces, which took on
themselves the main burden o-f combat operations in the
war . 57
Smirnov emphasized much the same themes in the
February Naval Pi qest ; his remarks, however, included
mention of the an ti -SLOC mission, though in a Kjery low-
ranking precedence:
[In Uor 1 d War II] the Navy rel iably insured the
stability o-f the coastal -flanks o-f the Red Army, [and]
delivered power-ful strikes on the ships, bases, and
communications of the enemy...^^
As noted above, and as would become even more
apparent later in the year, the theme of Navy unity and
precedence for suppor t-the-f 1 anks operations was
unusually prominent among Gorshkov's statements during
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this period, and -few substantive assertions on the place
o-f anti-SLOC in na^^al operations were to be -found.
Discussions o-f the economic and military signif-
icance o-f SLOCs to NATO appeared several times over the
course o-f the next several months. Articles in the
February and March issues o-f Naval D i pest noted the
importance o-f SLOCs to the economies o-f the littoral
nations o-f the Atlantic Basin. 59 i^j^-e Admiral Solov'yev
in particular noted that due to the maritime nature o-f
the NATO alliance and its dependence upon the
military-economic potential o-f the U.S.,
...there is a need to anticipate large scale battles
in the vast expanses o-f the World Ocean; the
i mpor tance o-f armed con-flict at sea... is increasing.*^^
Solov'yev hinted here at anti-SLOC operations
conducted on an oceanic scale, "in the vast expanses o-f
the World Ocean", rather than the littoral blockade
mission recommended by Stalbo the preceding year. The
d i -f -f erences between him and Solov^yev exempli-fy the two
schools o-f thought on the proper scale o-f anti-SLOC
operations; one school -favors the prosecution o-f
anti-SLOC operations in the more inshore areas, where
attacking -forces can be concentrated against both ships
and harbor areas. The other emphasizes an oceanic
anti-SLOC concept, wherein attacks would be conducted




In the May Naual Digest . Captain 1st Rank Ammon
ascribed to "-foreign specialists" the opinion that SLOCs
iMOU 1 d become even more important in the event o-f a
future war, and that "the merchant -f 1 ee t . . .w i 1 1 be
charged in wartime with maintaining the military-
economic potential of the state. "61 j p, that passage,
Ammon spelled out an explicit relationship upon which
the argument -for anti-SLOC rests: The military-economic
potential o-f the seapowers rests upon merchant tra-ffic;
hence attacking SLOCs is a basic element o-f smashing the
enemy capac i ty to make war
.
Uice Admiral Solov'yev repeated in June the now
f am i 1 i ar 1 anguage o-f justi-fication -for the vital nature
o-f SLOCs to NATO powers. More interestingly, he
included several force-ful and convincing quotes -from
"American naval strategists"; in particular, he quoted
Admiral Wright, -former SACLANT
:
In speaking o-f the importance o-f the Atlantic -for
transoceanic shipments, Admiral Wright remarked: "It
is di-fficult to overestimate the importance o-f the
Atlantic to the West. I -f we do not succeed in
prov i d i ng re 1 i abl e lines o-f commun ication in a -future
war, NATO's Armed Forces in Europe will be cut o-f-f
-from America and will su-f-fer de -feat. "62
The use o-f the opinions o-f "-foreign specialists",
attributed or unat tr i bu ted
,
is a commonplace -feature o-f
Soviet expository writing; what is quoted and how it is
treated, however, is o-f interest. Quotations employed
in 5n ideological context are o-ften used as verbal
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confirmation oi the hostility o-f the capitalist world.
In the context o-f the pro-f ess i onal mi 1 i tary press,
however, the quotation is o-ften selected so as to
implicitly bear out the truth o-f a proposition
—particularly when the excerpted passages go
uncriticized and are explicitly attributed to we 11 -known
Western military pro-f ess i onal s . In this case, Solo^^'yeu
used Admiral U)r i gh t '' s remark to argue -for a logical
(albeit controversial, hence implicitly stated)
conclusion: A strong an t i -SLOC campaign will have an
important, perhaps decisive e-f-fect on the outcome o-f a
war between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
A brie-f excerpt -from an article written by two Army
o-f-ficers appearing in the July issue o-f Mi 1 i tary-
Historical Journal provides insight to the grounds -for
putative Ground Force opposition to Navy emphasis on the
growing importance o-f an t i -SLOC operations. The article
brie-fly described the continental character o-f the Great
Patriotic War, and the resulting necessarily "de-fensive"
orientation o-f the Navy's operations
in supporting the operations o-f the Ground Forces...
Along with these, independent operations o-f the Navy
on maritime communications were also planned. "63
(But, as certi-fied with a quote from Sea Power of the
State
.
the defensive or i en tat i on-- that which mandated
support-the-fl anks operat i ons--prevai 1 ed> .
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I -f the Lomov-Al -ferov position represented in some
degree a Ground Forces point o-f view, it may be that the
dominant categorization o-f anti-SLOC as an "independent"
mission opened its proponents up to suspicions o-f
strategic disunity. Anti-SLOC was historically
conducted almost solely by the Navy, and more
importantly, by its separate appellation o-f
"independent", anti-SLOC is by de-finition a
non-supporting mission—one with no demonstrated close
relationship to the goals o-f the main con-flict, which
has been and remains the ground campaign. The
above-noted admonishment by Stalbo47 ^^ clearly
demonstrate how anti-SLOC supports the goals o-f the main
battle lends credence to this interpretation.
With the numerous articles in print to commemorate
Navy Day, <at least) -four declarations o-f Navy
solidarity with the Armed Forces appeared in major
military and civilian media; the -first appearing below
was released by Minister o-f De-fense Ustinov in Red Star
,
the second two by Fleet Admiral Gorshkov in a Radio
Moscow broadcast and in Pr_avda, respectively, and the
-fourth by Admiral Grishanov in I zvest i a .
Now the USSR Navy, in a single combat -formation with
the other services o-f the Armed Forces, is reliably
insuring the protection o-f socialist gains. ..<64
...the personnel o-f ships and units are guarding the
great gains of socialisrri care-fully in a single combat
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formation with the other services o-f the Armed Forces
o-f the Soviet Un i on . 65
The sortie of our Navy into the ocean ... C has]
augmented the capability o-f the Soviet Armed Forces
for repulsing aggression -from wherever it may come. 66
In the -fiery years o-f the Great Patriotic War, navymen
reliably insured the strategic stability o-f the
coastal -flanks o-f the vast front. Jointly with the
Ground Forces, they heroically de-fended coastal cities
and naval bases, landed assault -forces, and waged a




Navy Day is an occasion
historically devoted to declarations of solidarity with
the Armed Forces and the Soviet people. Nowhere in the
available texts cited above is the "independent"
anti-SLGC mission mentioned. Despite Gorshkov's high
ranking of anti-SLOC in Sea Power of the State
,
Admiral
Grishanov makes no mention of it as a wartime mission.
Grishanov's words represent virtually the ideal
canon--from an ostensible Ground Forces perspec t i ve--f or
the Navy's participation in the war. The only Navy
contribution to be (even vaguely) acknowledged which is
not directly related to Ground Force missions or
operations is cited last. The near identity of Ustinov's
and Gorshkov's statements, the wide dissemination of the
message through Red Star
.
the major mil i tary newspaper,
Radio Moscow, and the party and state national
newspapers suggests the intent to widely reinforce an
important precept—unity of the Navy's history and goals
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with those o-f the Armed Forces as a who1e--which some in
the military hierarchy may have -felt was not as well
understood as it ought to be by all concerned.
Gorshkov returned once again to the cooperation
theme be-fore the year is out, with a conventional
recitation o-f Navy missions during the war:
CIn Uorld War II, the Navy conducted the -following
missions in support o-f the de-fensive operations o-f the
Ground Forces in coastal sectors:]
(1) Cooperated with the Ground Forces to secure their
strategic -flanks...
(2) Conducted independent operations on the
communications o-f the adversary;...
During the strategic o-f-fensives, the -fleets:
(1) Aided in de-feating the coastal [ground] forces o-f
the enemy;
<2) Disrupted the supply and evacuation o-f his
troops ; . .
.
The Navy Cin World War II] sank hundreds o-f enemy
combatant and merchant ships carrying troops and
various cargoes at sea and at their bases. The enemy
did not receive critically needed re i n-f orcemen ts .
These very signi-ficant losses o-f ten prevented him -from
-fully using even those troops which were already on
the -field o-f battl e .68
O-f note, Gorshkov returned to the relatively high
(second place) ranking -for anti-SLGC, which was more
commensurate with that earlier accorded to it in Sea
Power o-f the State . It was also notable that he
adopted the Stalbo approach to Justi-fying the importance
o-f an t i -SLOC--he incorporated at least a cursory account
o-f the e-f-fect ship/ tonnage losses had on German
capability to -fight the ground battle.
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A very junior o-f-ficer, Captain 3rd Rank Kabalin,
contributed to the an t i -SLOC discussion in August, not
with a mission statement or recommendation -for the
Soviet Navy, but with a report on the NATO exercise
"Ocean Sa-f ar i "
—
which by what is reported, and by the
fact o-f its acceptance by the Naval Pi gest editorial
board (which included ^ice Admiral Stalbo), suggests
that more senior Navy o-f-Ficers deemed it a signi-ficant
con tr i bu t i on
.
The NATO command holds that, in the event o-f a war in
Europe, one o-f the missions o-f the naval -forces would
be [protecting SLOCs]...the main threat would be
presented by the [USSR's] submarines. The NATO command
views this problem as a very di-f-ficult one and
•foresees heavy losses. These losses, in the
estimation o-f special ists, could amount to as much as
66'/, o-f the total o-f merchant ships. There-fore,
antisubmarine war-fare would be o-f decisive
s i gn i -f i cance . 69
Kabalin also employed the "-foreign specialist"
device to advance a possibly controversial thesis;
however, he equates heavy shipping losses with "decisive
sign-ficance", which is a reprise to the pre -Stalbo
technique o-f Justi-fying an ti -SLOC operations.
At year's end, Kuz'min asserts, though does nothing
to demonstrate, a direct relationship between anti-SLOC
and the ground campaign:
...the disruption and limitation o-f the ac t i ons . . . o-f
the merchant ships themselves [as a result o-f sea
blockade] exert a direct in-fluence on the capability
o-f the enemy -for -further oppos i t i on . '^0
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Kuz^'min, like Kabalin above, i -f he had taken Stalbo
to heart, appeared to ha^^e no clear perception o-f how to
proceed in relating the in-fluence o-f anti-SLOC on the
ground campaign. In that regard, the most explicit
responses to Stalbo's advice appeared to have come -from
^'' yunenkO'-'O
J
and to lesser degree, -from Gorshkov
h i mse 1 -f .
GorshkoVs re-ferences to anti-SLOC since Sea PoiAier
o-f the State through 1978 were entirely retrospective
and Soviet Navy-or i en ted-- i . e . , he treated only o-f the
Great Patriotic War and never o-f the anti-SLOC
operat i ons o-f the Western allies. His rank i ng o-f Sov i e t
Navy anti-SLOC during the war was also quite variable
over the period. These -factors invite the speculation
that both the historical and the current status o-f
anti-SLOC were "hot" issues—hot enough to induce him to
forswear -for a time the somewhat heretical "progressive"
position vis-a-vis oceanic anti-SLOC until an initial
consensus had material ized. Relatively junior (hence
obscure) o-fficers such as U^yunenko^O g^^j^j Kabal i n*^^ were
advancing the more "progressive" themes during this
period, while GorshkoVs public statements would
probably be subjected to exacting scrutiny at the
General Sta-f-f level . He may there -fore have been obi iged
to modi-fy his previous "progressive" statements to
better con -form t "conservative" General Sta-f-f
S6
orthodoxy. The utter lack o-f CINC Navy commentary on
current SLOC issues could indicate that the issue was
currently so disputatious in the General Staf-f that it
was deemed prudent to maintain silence rather than
reveal open dispute at the most senior levels o-f
military leadership.
tj/
IW. THE ANTI-SLOC DEBATE 1979-80
A. TRANSITION YEARS
The years 1979-1980 were a transitional period in
the anti-SLOC debate; the frequency o-f relevant articles
a-fter mid- 1979 was to -fall o-f-f radically -from that
observed during the years 1976-1978. The trend o-F
diminishing discussion becomes apparent by re-ference to
the -following -figures. Using Naval D i qest and
M i 1 i tary-H i stor i cal Journal as the source periodicals,
this study has uncovered the -following distribution o-f
articles involving signi-ficant discussion o-f anti-SLOC
ope rat i ons
:
Total 7 6 9 8 3
For the years 1976-1979, a mean o-f 7.5 articles per
year centered on or involved a discussion o-f anti-SLOC
in a historical and/or current context. Beginning in
1980, and continuing into subsequent years, the rate o-f
discussion measured by numbers o-f articles diminishes to
less than hal-f that observed previously. This reduction
may be due to a sh i -f t in m i 1 i tary doc trine, wh i ch will
be discussed in Chapter ^^I I .
Despite the reduction in nutribers o-f contributions,
signi-ficant aspects o-f the debate come to light during
this period. They include: Fleet Admiral Smirnov
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reiterated StalbCs call -for new analysis o-f anti-SLOC
operations, which suggested that the anti-SLOC mission
had yet to be justi-fied at senior leuels o-f the military
hierarchy; a comprehensive " progress i k'e " assessment o-f
anti-SLOC operations was made by Captain 1st Rank
Makeyev; and a book by a Ground Forces author revealed
the origin o-f an enduring evaluation o-f the anti-SLOC
mission as an "independent" type o-f mission rather than
a "Joint" type o-f mission.
B. 1979 CONTINUED CONSERVATISM AND LULL
In February, Captains 1st Rank Bannikov and
Filamashin published an article in M i 1 i tary-H i stor i cal
Journal entitled "Blockade Actions o-f the Navies in the
First World War, 1914-18". Several o-f the reasons
assessed -for the lack o-f success o-f both British and
German naval -forces during the war were o-f interest due
to their i mp 1 i cat i ons -for pos i t i on i ng the au thors in the
current anti-SLOC debate. The two major conclusions o-f
interest were:
1) Blockades must be o-f a geographic scale
commensurate with the numbers o-f -forces available.
Blockades over large distances are usually not
e-f -f ec t i ve .
2) Raiding operations which are not coordinated with
Ground Forces operations will be o-f little
signi-ficant e-f -feet. 71
The -first conclusion -fell in with the littoral-
bl ockade school o-f thought as championed by Stalbo. The
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wider-ranging oceanic an t i -SLOC blockade mission was
disparaged; according to the authors, neither England or
Germany was successful in imposing a wide-scale blockade
on the other during World War 1.72 jy^^ second argues
for the necessity o-f integrating anti-SLOC (widely
characterized as an "independent" mission) with the
requirements o+ the ground campaign. Each conclusion
was probably more in consonance with the "conservative"
General Sta-ff perception o-f appropriate naval strategy,
which would be to tie the Navy closely to the -flanks and
structure their operations wholly in coordination with
those o-f the Ground Forces.
Sysoyev returned in March to Naval Pi qest with a
study o-f naval operations during the Great Patriotic
War. He cited the German Admiral Ruge on the importance
o-f secure SLGCs to the Wehrmacht e-f-fort on the Eastern
Front: "Waging war in this desolate area C the northern
•flank] depended entirely on the capacity to maintain
transport by sea. "73 Later in the article, he asserted,
without arguing -for, the "substantial e-ffect" which
anti-SLOC action had "in the coastal sectors o-f the
-fronts. "7^
Sysoyev made what might be called the "minimalist"
claim -for the in-fluence o-f anti-SLOC on the ground
battle— that it did have influence, but only in the
coastal sectors, which, o-f course, were scarcely the
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most important o-f the war. In his 1 i sting of the types
o-f operations conducted by the Soviet Navy, those
conducted jointly with the Army were listed -first; among
the second group o-f "independent" Navy operations,
anti-SLOC was listed -first74
—more evidence o-f the low
priority given to what are assessed to be non-supportive
m i ss i ons
.
Fleet Admiral Egorov set -forth the same 1 i sting in
Military-Historical Journal two months later— that
assisting the Ground Forces was -first priority, and that
anti-SLOC was -first among the "independent m i ss i ons" '''^
,
Such modest agreement between two senior Admirals could
be evidence o-f at least a -factional consensus on the
status o-f anti-SLOC, a -faction tending to the
"conservative" side o-f the debate.
In May, Fleet Admiral Smirnov echoed Stalbo's
February 1977 admonition to research care-fully the
e-f-fect o-f anti-SLOC on the ground campaign.
A-fter all, in order to make quite clear the role
played by the Navy in the war, it is absolutely
essential to determine Just how the damage in-flicted
on the enemy at sea a-f-fected the -fighting capacity o-f
his army groups on land... the destruction o-f enemy
ships at their bases, the e-f-fect o-f strikes against
sea and ocean communications on combat actions on
land, [is] in need o-f some extensive and purpose-ful
study . ''^
The reappearance o-f Stalbo''s theme over the
signature o-f a Fleet Admiral would suggest that so -far
as the highest levels o-f military leadership were
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concerned, there was st i 11 no adequate analysis to
support the rationale -for a high-priority anti-SLOC
campaign. The appropriate de^^e 1 opmen ts had not come to
pass, and the status o-f the anti-SLOC mission remained
uncer tain.
At midyear. Captain 1st Rank Aristoy discussed the
development o-f Soviet anti-SLOC actions during the war.
In the initial stages, anti-SLOC actions were sporadic,
inadequately organized, ^nd hence -failed of their
goal — the complete destruction o-f the convoys. However,
when "operational cooperation between heterogeneous
-forces" was attained, operational goals were
success-ful ly achieved. 77 Aristov's article incorporated
two di-f-ferent points. One operational point was that
success-ful anti-SLOC operations depend in large part
upon adequate -forms o-f -force control . One strategic
point was that success-ful anti-SLOC operations depend in
large part upon the cooperation between di-f-ferent types
o-f -f circes--an assessment which may signal a trend to
evaluate anti-SLOC in terms more inclusive o-f the other
branches o-f the Armed Forces.
At the same time, yet another detailed study o-f
modern SLOCs came -forth -from Captain 2nd Rank Strelkov.
This e-f-fort analyzed the current volume, type, and
patterns f ocean trade in the Pac i -f i c Basin, and
cone 1 udes:
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The island status o-f a number o-f countries and the
great expanse o+ the ocean routes places securing sea
communications among the first-priority problems. 78
StrelkoM's approach and conclusions are o-f a
f am i 1 i ar type
,
bu t is ev i dence in its banal i ty o-f the
persistent e-f-fort to marshal analyses which support an
anti-SLOC strategy. Strelkov appears to be coming down
on the side o-f the oceanic anti-SLOC school rather than
that o-f the littoral blockade school.
Another contribution by Fleet Admiral Smirnov, this
in July, cites "command documents" written prior to the
beginning o-f the war which codi-fied the Navy's missions.
They were, (in order): O-f -f ensile operations in "open sea
and air", o-f-fensi^^e operations in the coastal zone and
against enemy bases, active coastal defense, cooperation
with Ground Force operations in the coastal zone, 3L0C
protection operations, and finally, anti-SLOC
operat i ons.79 Nonetheless, "the stability of the
[Soviet] defense and the tempo of the offensives" much
depended upon the success of anti-SLOC, "one of the most
important m i ss i ons" . 8Ci
Smirnov's message is somewhat mixed; the list of
mission areas suggests a low place for anti-SLOC, and
the theme of shoulder-to-shoulder with the Ground Forces
is treated with traditional reverence. However, he also
notes (3 pages later) that anti-SLOC had an important
influence on the course of the fighting on the ground
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fronts. The implicit conclusion may be that an t i -SLOC
action turned out to be, in retrospect, o+ greater
import than than was reflected in pre-war mission
assi gnmen ts
.
In July, Captain 1st Rank Makayev dramatically
re-opened the current anti-SLOC debate with a strongly
argued "progressive" littoral blockade position based on
a comprehensive evaluation o-f the importance of SLOCs in
a -future war. According to Makayev, each o-f th two
World Wars demonstrated the tendency -for expansion in
the scope o-f anti-SLOC operations. Local wars since
then—Korea and U i e tnam--bore out that tendency; both
required large shipments o-f men and material to support
military operations. However, when his discussion turned
to the modern era, Makayev, with -familiar technique,
made his argument with the unchallenged assessments and
quotes o-f "-foreign specialists" and U.S. Admirals. For
ex amp 1 e
,
Under modern conditions, according to -foreign
specialists, transoceanic communications will play the
role o-f a most important -factor determining the course
and outcome o-f the war in continental T^/iDs . " I -f we
cannot insure the reliability o-f our c ommu n i c a t i on s in
a -future war, observed American Admiral Wright, "the
NATO armed -forces in Europe will be cut o-f-f -from
American and de-f eated" . 81
And,
In view o-f the enor'^ous dependence o-f the economies
and combat capabil i es o-f the -forces o-f many states
on uninterrupted sea communications, it is logical to
expect that the combat actions on communications will
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be intense. The experience of the past gives evidence
o-f this. They will be conducted on a wide scale,
pressing into service considerable forces and means.
Such views are held, -for example, by the
Commander-in-Chief of NATO naval forces. Admiral Kidd,
and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet,
k.'ice Admiral En gen. 82
Anti-SLOC, according to Makeyev
,
will be conducted
with two types of operations: those aimed at destroying
convoys and individual ships at sea, and those aimed at
destroying port areas and defending forces. (Destruction
of transport aircraft will also be an important part of
the overall effort). Moreover, the use of nuclear
weapons against all types of targets would "create
favorable conditions" for further prosecution with
conventional weapons. 83 Blockading operations are a
feasible alternative to the more difficult mission of
oceanic anti-SLOC; under modern conditions, blockade
will be a component of the anti-SLOC struggle, and will
be a Joint operation with the other armed forces. The
outcome of the anti-SLOC campaign will have a powerful
influence on the course of the war:
The success of mi 1 i tary operat i ons and capac i ty of
individual countries to resist will depend to a great
extent on the outcome of the confl ict on the
transoceanic SL0C.S4
Makeyev's article was a powerful, unified
presentation, made all the more effective by its
crafting. He brought the other Armed Forces "on board"
anti-SLOC, and argued for blockade operations as the
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most e-f-fective technique o-f anti-SLOC. Blockading
operations, according to Makeye*^ , are easier to conduct
than the oceanic mission. Anti-SLOC goals
—
undermining
the military-economic potential o-f the enemy— are o-f
prime importance, but blockade operations are quite
consonant with the more traditional role o-f the Navy,
which was as an inshore instrument, hence geographically
more associated with the land campaign and coordinated
with/subordinated to/ less "independent" o-f the Ground
Forces .
MakeyeVs mention o-f anti-SLOC in the a-ftermath o-f
nuclear strikes was also o-f interest in its novelty in
the open literature; it suggested a belie-f that a war-
under such conditions could be o-f a duration such that
attrition o-f sea shipments would still be o-f signi-ficant
in-fluence— in other words, a long "limited nuclear war"
scenar i o
.
In the Navy Day < Ju 1 y 30) issue o-f Red Star . Fleet
Admiral Smirnou made brie-f re-ference to heavy German
merchant and combatant shipping losses on the Eastern
Front, "which made a considerable contribution to
smashing the military machine o-f the -fascist Reich. "85
It's mention is o-f interest by contrast to its absence
in years past. Barring that brie-f re-ference, the
anti-SLOC issue sur -faces no more -for the remainder o-f
the year; the extended silence, by comparison to the
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voluminous discussion which has been noted during the
preceding years, could indicate that the issue may have
become altogether too divisive -for -further public
airing, and that a period of consensus-building was
deemed to be in order.
C. 1980 THE LULL CONTINUES
The open press was virtually silent on the topic of
an t i -SLOC issues through much of 1980 as well; however,
one contribution which reveals the background for the
distinction maintained by Soviet writers between
missions which "support" the Ground Forces and those
which are "independent" came from a book by Colonel I.
A. Korotkov . That source cited the Field Regulations of
the Red Army 1940 as the origin of the distinction.
It was planned that the Navy would be employed for
support of the action of the Ground Forces in coastal
sectors and for independent operations with the aim of
destroying the navy of an enemy at sea, of interfering
with his sea communications, and of destroying naval
bases and [other] coastal i nstal 1 at i ons .86
Korotkov later reiterated the dichotomy: Joint
operations involved suppor t-the-f 1 ank missions,
amphibious operations, and defense against amphibious
assault; independent operations included ant
i
-naval,
an ti -SLOC, and attacks against shore installations.
Moreover, submarines were viewed as a type of naval
vessel "intended basically Conly] for action on sea
commun i cat i ons . " 37
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The origin o-f "joint" and "independent" types o-f
operations shed 1 i gh t on a possible reason -for what
appears to be a considerable gu 1 -f between the
"conservatives" and the "progressives" in the continuing
anti-SLOC controversy. The governing orders in -force
for the Red Army during the -first phases o-f the Great
Patriotic War had made clear the two basic types o-f
naval operations— the "joint" and the "independent".
Throughout the course o-f the war, the realities o-f
the time— a massive invasion on a broad continental
front which could only be thrown back with enormous
resources o-f men and equipment on the ground, the small
enclosed seas on the continental -flanks, the types and
numbers o-f naval -forces available, (which were quite
inadequate to break through and -fight an oceanic
campaign)— all inevitably mandated that the Navy could
do no more than -fight close on the -flanks o-f the ground
-front, whether in "joint" amphibious operations or
"independent" anti-SLOC operations. The supporting,
subordinate character o-f Soviet naval operations during
that time, their de -facto "jointness", was established
by the limits o-f the possible.
However, in the postwar era
—
particularly beginning
in the mid-60's as the Navy expanded in numbers and
sizes o-f ships, operating areas, and destructive power,
it became truly oceanic. The Navy's capability to ca^rry
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out world-wide missions became unique; its reach had
expanded
-far beyond that o-f the Ground Forces. The
potential
-for independent operations became real--it had
the potential to conduct "independent" operations not
merely in the vicinity o-f Kronstadt or the Crimea, but
at the GIUK gap, on the -far reaches o-f the Atlantic and
Pacific SLOCs, and beyond.
At the same time, some Navy wr i ters--some junior-
contributors, but the CINC Navy in particular, were
analyzing the both the Great Patriotic Ular and/or
current problems in such a way that the lessons o-f the
war were devalued or rede-fined in some subtle ways.
Some commentaries strongly hinted or stated explicitly
that the type o-f operations re-f erred to in Field
ReQu 1 at i ons as "independent" were o-f greater overall
s i gn i -f i cance than those "Joint" operations which in -fact
had been the Navy's main mission during the war— the
impl ication being that the Navy's employment should
emphasize "independent" oceanic anti-SLOC
operations--due to their e-f-fect on the military-economic
potential o-f the enemy—rather than "joint" operations
with the Ground Forces. And, as the
Stal bo-Gorshkov-Sm i rnov remarks noted above suggest,
some signi-ficant group among the senior military
leadership were unconvinced that "independent" anti-SLOC
operations had any signi-ficant impact on the course o-f
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ground campaigns, at least within the context o-f current
military strategy.
For eight months, the anti-SLOC discussion vanished
from the pages o-f the open press; the -final re-fere nces
recommence in October 1980 when Captain 1st Rank
Dmitriyev published an article in M i 1 i tary-Hi stor i cal
Journal on Soviet submarine operations during the -first
part o-f the Great Patriotic War. He characterized SLOCs
as o-f "great military-economic and operational
importance" to German -forces, both in terms o-f troop
movements and shipments o-f raw materials to industrial
centers. 38 ^j^ remarks are distinguished -for their
non-committal moderation, as were those o-f Fleet Admiral
Sergeyev in reviewing Captain Basov's recently published
book The Navy in the Great Patriotic Uar . 1941-1945 i n
the October issue o-f Naval D i qest ; in that review, he
notes :
The Navy was assigned the -f ol 1 ow i ng m i ss i ons : to
cooperate in SK^ery way with the Ground Forces in
coastal sectors and to inter-fere with the sea
communications o-f the enemy. 89
Here was another occasion o-f the clear distinction
made in the theory o-f the time between cooperative
missions and anti-SLOC missions— theory which, it would
appear, still has a power-ful in-fluence on the direction
and character o-f the anti-SLOC debate. Later that year,
Admiral Navoitsev similarly approved o-f Basov's
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characterization o-f the two basic types o-f na^^al
missions during the war. 90
Admiral Sysoyev's discussion o-f "Development o-f the
Forms o-f Uar-fare at Sea" ( Naval D i qest . November 1980)
was o-f interest due to its theme o-f consideration o-f
war-fare at sea as basically a Joint operation— a theme
earlier -forwarded by Captain 1st Rank Aristov'^^.
While be-fore war-fare at sea was the prerogative o-f the
Navy, now nearly every service o-f the Armed Forces can
carry on combat in the oceanic and sea theaters. ^^
The years 1979-1980 were remarkable -for the dearth
o-f commentary in the open press on the topic o-f
anti-SLOC. Although it could be concluded that the
absence o-f debate signalled a solution or resolution o-f
the outstanding issues, several factors suggest
otherwise. In May 1979, Fleet Admiral Smirnov'^^
signalled the continuing relevance o-f Stalbo's theme to
study closely the in-fluence o-f anti-SLOC on ground
campaigns. Since then, Gorshkov , the CINC Navy, had
made no pronouncement on the topic (at least in any o-f
the major pro-f ess i onal Journals, which is where the
mainstream o-f the debate had been conducted to date).
It may be hypothesized that, at this Juncture, the
anti-SLOC debate was to some degree exhausted; there
appeared to be no resolution o-f the central theoretical
and practical aspects o-f relating anti-SLOC operations
to ground campaign operations. Nor was there any clear
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consensus on the issue o-f the strategic allocation o-f
e-f-fort in an an t i -SLOC campaign— that is, whether or not
an t i -SLOC is best conducted on an oceanic scale, in




Kf. THE ANTI-SLQC DEBATE 1981-1983
A. TREND TO PROGRESSIUI SM
Like much o-F 1979-1980, the explicit anti-SLOC
debate was -frequently absent -from the pages o-f the
periodical press during the period 1981-1983; during
that three year span, only six sign-ficant anti-SLOC
articles appeared. However, 1981 marked the
commencement of the Theory o-f the Nayy Debate. The
process o-f that debate is o-f considerable interest as a
separate but related topic, and will treated in Chapter
Kfl . This chapter continues the assessment o-f the
anti-SLOC debate as it progressed during the period o-f
the Theory o-f the Nauy Debate, which was concluded by
Admiral Gorshkov in July 1983.
In general, it could be said that this period o-f the
anti-SLOC debate emphasized the conduct o-f anti-SLOC as
a "joint" operation with other branches o-f the Armed
Forces; most noticeable, howeuer , was the growing
pre-eminence o-f the "progressive" -faction. In
particular, the articles by Rear Admiral Pushkin and
Uice Admiral Gontayev, the only anti-SLOC analyses to
appear during late 1 982-m i d 1983, gave distinctly
-favorable reviews o-f German anti-SLOC operations during
l/Jor 1 d War II, and how such operations could be conducted
even more e-ftectively in modern tirries.
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B. 1981 FIRST INDICATIONS
Only three articles dealing with anti-SLOC appeared
in the pro-f ess i onal military press during 1981. One was
by Captains 1st Rank Lukyanov and Soloy yev in the March
issue o-f Nat^al Pi qest , wherein they reiterated in
familiar language the current economic and military
significance o-f the Atlantic SL0Cs92_ Another by i,/'ice
Admiral SoloVyev in the April issue ot Na^al D i qest ,
discussed the importance o-f merchant -fleets in the past
and during modern times; in -form and content, it was
also a -familiar type of argumen t ... "Accord i ng to the
[American] specialists, SLOC will be of enormous
s i gn i f i cance in all k i nds of m i 1 i tary conf 1 i c ts . "93
The third article of consequence, this by Admiral
Sysoyev , appeared in the September issue of M i 1 i tary-
Historical Journal . By and large a recapitulation of
familiar criticisms of German and Allied naval forces
control during World War II, it incorporated summary
remarks bearing out the requirement to conduct anti-SLOC
operations as a joint undertaking rather than as a
unique Navy mission:
The war demonstrated the fact that it was unfeasible
to attempt to disrupt the communications of a large
enemy state with a single branch of forces, even in
large numbers and with reliable control. 94
Sysoyev also noted that, due to the scale of
anti-SLOC (and SLOC defense) operations, it became
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necessary to control them at the "higher leuels" o-f
command--re i nf ore i ng the concept o-f the use o-f naval
-forces in concert with other branches (at the T'v'D or
higher level). The lessons to be drawn -from the record
o-f the battles in the Atlantic emphasized the
requirement -for coordination o-f planning, control, and
execution o-f oceanic anti-SLOC operations with other
branches .
C. 1982 THE PROGRESSIVES EMERGE
Captains 1st Rank Morozov and Krivinsky returned to
the topic o-f SLOCs in the August Naval Pi pes
t
<a-fter
more than a six-year absences?) with a survey o-f the
importance o-f straits and narrows and the types o-f
combat actions associated with them. According to the
authors, the experience of World War II demonstrated the
importance o-f straits and narrows "as an important
military-geographical factor determining the course and
outcome of armed struggle in individual parts of the
ocean. "95 g^ch areas are increasing in importance due to
three basic factors:
1) Increases in the scale of ocean shipping.
2) The probable coalition nature of a future war,
which will involve the need for intertheater naval
maneuvers and resupply of ground forces.
75
3) The improvement o-f naval weaponry, particularly
nuc 1 ear-m i ss i 1 e weaponry, which increases naval
capabilities in the battles for straits. 96
According to the authors, due to the increase in
capabilities o-f modern weapons, sensors, and plat-forms
(particulary long range aviation), many areas which are
not straits or narrows in the literal sense are now
subject to similar blockades by coordinated al 1 -arms
forces. Some -far northern straits, including the Bering
and Drake straits, and the straits o-f the "Canadian
archipelago" will become much more important in the case
o-f a -future war than has previously been the case.9<^'
The Morozov-Kr i V i nsky article brought up several new
points o-f interest. In order, they are:
1) Straits and narrows are o-f special relevance in
the conduct o-f blockade operations. This aspect o-f
an t i -SLOC operations had not previously appeared in
the discussion, but indicates a sensitivity to their
utility in allowing the concentration o-f -force at a
particular point to achieve the goals o-f an ti -SLOC.
2) The application o-f the term "blockade" was
extended to cover operations conducted in the broader
oceanic zone outside o-f restricted waters. Previous
mentions o-f broad area blockading operations conducted
during the two world wars had disparaged their
e-f -f ec t i veness
,
and had made no remark upon current
•feasibility. It would appear that at least the
authors now bel ieve that current technology and
techniques o-f -force control enable the e-f-fective
prosecution o-f blockades over wider areas than was the
case in the past
.
3) Far northern straits areas were spec i -f i cal 1 y
mentioned as being o-f increased s i gn i -f i cance in the
modern era. Although the authors do not spell out the
reason -for this, they may be implying the use of such
areas as -focal points -for de-fensive blockades to SSBN
bastions in polar and high sub-polar areas.
In October, Rear Admiral Pushkin published a
detailed article which favorably reviewed German
submarine raiding operations off the U.S. east coast
during Uor 1 d War II. The author described the German
decision to commit submarines to those special
operations as "unquestionably wise". The submarine
attacks on the coastal SLGCs
...literally stunned the command of the U.S. Navy. A
shortage of forces prevented the Americans from
organizing effective ASW defense of the shipping
1 anes.97
According to Pushkin, the great German successes in
the early stages of the campaign were due to surprise,
skillful shifting of the focus of attacks from place to
place, and lack of U.S. preparation for A3W . The U.S.
was able to prevail only after a considerable buildup of
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forces, development of e-f-fective ASU technologies, and
re-finement o-f the convoy system.
In summarizing the modern development o-f Western ASW
strategy, Pushkin concluded
The potential o-f contemporary nuclear-powered
submarines to disrupt shipping has increased
i mmeasurabl y . .
.
the NATO leadership believes that the
problems o-f combatting nuc 1 ear -powered submarines are
still -far -from being solved. 98
Pushkin's article was unique in the level o-f detail
it presents in the treatment o-f German anti-SLOC, and in
the numerous approving statements made about the conduct
and e-f -f ec t i veness o-f the br i e-f German campaign.
Previous analyses o-f the whole period o-f the Battle -for
the Atlantic had generally accounted -for the eventual
German -failure in terms o-f errors in resource allocation
to submarine construction, lack o-f support -from other
naval arms, and the vast Allied ASUI e-f -fort. Pushkin
made but br i e-f mention o-f the -first two -factors, and
emphasized instead the s i gn i -f i cance o-f U.S. counter-
measures—and then concludes on the note that no such
coun termeasures have been developed against
nuc 1 ear -powered submarines in the modern era.
D. 1983 THE FINAL WORD
Only one signi-ficant anti-SLOC article appeared
prior to the end o-f the Theory o-f the Navy Debate in
July. It was, however, quite important in that it, like
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that o-f Pushkin above, treated the German anti-SLOC
campaign in a -favorable light, with a view to the
lessons to be learned -from it.
k^ice Admiral Gontayev published a major article in
the January Naval D i qest concerning the anti-SLOC
battles o-f Ulor 1 d Ular II and the lessons to be drawn -from
them. He makes a generally -favorable review o-f the
conduct o-f the German submarine campaign; the German
High Command was "basically correct" in its estimate o-f
requiring 700-750 submarines to achieve strategic
success in the Atlantic. The variety o-f submarine types
was kept to a minimum, and the correctness o-f "wol -f
pack" tactics was demonstrated by re-ference to their
resul ts.99
Gontayev also be 1 i eved that the German uses o-f
-forward bases acquired by territorial conquest was quite
i mpor tan t
:
An essential role in raising the e-f-fectiveness o-f the
-fight on communications was played by the expansion o-f
the system o-f basing German submarines. The capture
in 1939-1940 o-f Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium,
France and Greece permitted the Germans to deploy
sul^narines more rapidly and more sa-fely on various
axes, while increasing the submarines stays at sea,
and to make wide use o-f ship repair -facilities and
shipbuilding yards o-f the occupied coun tr i es . 1 "^0
The German command coriimitted a major error, however,
in conducting an i ndescr i m
i
nate transport tonnage war
rather than speci-fically targeting submarines against
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military shipments, which were often o-f paramount
strategic significance.
Soviet military science considers this one o-f the
chief flaws of the strategic principles of using
Germany's f orces ...[ because the submarine campaign
thus] did not inflict essential damage on the
military-economic potential of Great Britain and the
Un i ted States. 101
Other shortcomings and errors noted by the author echo
those recounted by previous commentators (including
Gorshkov): inadequate air reconnaissance, inadequate
an t i -ASW support, problems of control
,
etc.
Gontayev quoted Sea Power of the State to
characterize the change in the strategic situation
facing the USSR since the end of World War II: "...now
we are threatened with a coalition of naval powers,
[and] under certain conditions, these C ocean] axes could
be the main ones. "102 |_|g, reported without comment the
opinion of "foreign specialists" that
Transoceanic commun
i
cat i ons ... have become the most
important factor that determines the course and
outcome of a war in continental theaters... In a future
war, the military-political circles of the United
States and NATO directly link the fate of NATO armed
forces with the reliability of commun
i
cat i ons . . . 1 03
He also expected that the scope of an t i -SLOC
operations will be increased due to the range of
nuclear-powered submarines. He remarked through another
unattributed "Western opinion" that
...one should expect an avoidance of a "hunt for
tonnage" in favor of the complete disruption of sea
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communications, which at certain stages o-f a war will
acquire the most important strategic s i gn i -f i cance . 1 04
Gontayev produced a point o-f view-- that anti-SLOC
operations -focussed on military shipments are o-f much
greater s i gn i -f i cance than a general "tonnage war"— -from
two purportedly di-fferent -forums in this article. One
source was retrospective conclusion on the nature o-f
German errors during World War II as adduced by Soviet
military science. The other source was a prediction o-f
submarine strategy in a -future war by unspeci-fied
"Western opinion". It is not unusual -for Soviet writers
to cite the origins or authors o-f Western points o-f
view; the absence o-f any such i den t i -f i cat i on anywhere in
an otherwise we 1 1 -documen ted article (14 re-ferences)
plus the identity o-f views between Soviet military
science and "Western opinion" suggests that Soviet,
rather than Western views o-f -future submarine operations
are being communicated in this case.
Such is probably also the true -for Gontayev's
ostensible reporting o-f the "Western opinion" that
nuclear-powered submarines are not only e-ffective
against warships and transports, but also against
"loading and unloading points"— i.e., the use o-f
submarines against harbors and port -facilities. Here as
in the cases above, Gontayev may be using the device o-f
reporting Western assessment o-f possible Soviet
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submarine operations (without criticizing those reports)
as a way to disseminate i n-f ormat i on about current
practices ot naval art.
That issue o-f interpretation aside, Gontayev's
article is also of interest due to the 1 ine taken that
anti-SLOC war-fare can/will be the most important -factor
in determining the outcome o-f a war in Europe. The
strong, explicit character o-f this opinion is
unprecedented, and may indicate that the "progressives"
in the anti-SLOC debate were presenting a convincing
case -for a high-priority anti-SLOC campaign at the
General Sta-f-f level.
Gontayev, like Pushkin, was also quite unusual in
his positive review o-f German submarine operations and
tactics. Like Pushkin, reported what, in his view, was
done correctly and e-f f ec t i ve 1 y . Rather than -focussing
almost exclusively on the strategic -failures o-f the
German High Command, he devoted close attention to the
the operational and tactical successes and -failures o-f
the German submarine -forces; he highlighted the lessons
to be learned -from the German experience, and obi iquely
communicated how some o-f those lessons were being
incorporated to modern naval art.
Two articles devoted to anti-SLOC operations
appeared at midyear. Just be-fore the end o-f the Theory
o-f the Navy Debate; both were analyses o-f Soviet
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submarine operations during the Great Patriotic Uar
.
That by Captain 1st Rank KarmenoKlOS
j p, ^^y concerned
the problems and solutions o-f operational control o-f
submarines in littoral waters; that by Rear Admiral
PushkinlO<^ in June reviewed the overall operations o-f
Soviet submarines during the war with emphasis on
anti-SLOC. Neither presented new insights to the status
or process o-f the development o-f anti-SLOC thinking in
the pro-f ess i onal community; their appearance did,
however, signal the continuing relevance o-f the
anti-SLOC issue as a topic o-f pro-f ess i onal interest.
The years 1981-1983 marked a turnaround in the tone
and orientation o-f the anti-SLOC debate; the late trend,
exempli-fied by Sysoyev
,
Pushkin, and Gontayev above, was
to "emphasize the positive" in assessment o-f the past
record and present potential o-f such operations. It
appeared that anti-SLOC had been re-evaluated as a
"respectable" Navy mission, one to be -fully explored -for
lessons to be appl i ed in a modern context. The topic
and process o-f the Theory o-f the Navy Debate may well
have had an important part to play in that re-assessmen
t
o-f the anti-SLOC mission, and attention will now turn to
that i ssue .
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^I . 1981-1983! THEORY OF THE NAk^Y DEBATE
The Theory o-f the Navy Debate commenced in April and
May 1981 with the appearance o-f two articles in Naval
Pi qest by k^ice Admiral Stalbo entitled "Some Issues of
the Theory o-f the Development and Employment o-f the
Navy" . I t -featured a remarkabl e degree o-f strong and
explicit disagreement artiong the contributors, and was
conducted in good part among quite senior o-f-ficers,
including Fleet Admiral Gorshkov . Indeed, the debate was
so intense as to arouse the suspicion among some
observers that it amounted to an attack upon Gorshkov
himsel-f, one possibly associated with an attempt to
accompl i sh his removal as Commander in Chie-f o-f the
Navy. 110 Although that anticipated result has not come
to pass, the Theory of the Navy Debate, (hereinafter
TND) , is a significant period in the survey of the
anti-SLOC debate, for its development has implications
for addressing the divisive issues which had arisen to
date among the anti-SLOC participants. (For the sake of
proper perspective, it should be noted that only half of
the ten articles comprising TND address issues of direct
relevance to the anti-SLOC debate; if anti-SLOC was a
source of TND, it was certainly not the only significant
issue to surface during the course of the exchange).
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A central problem -for those who have i mp 1 i ed a more
important role -for the anti-SLOC mission has been to
relate the immediate e-f-fect of anti-SLOC operations
--enemy losses o-f merchant ships--to its ultimate
in-fluence on the outcome in the decisive continental
theaters ot operations. As has been previously noted,
Stalbo -first noted this need in February-March 1977 and
called -for the requisite historical study and
theoretical e 1 abor at i on48
^ g^n^^ subsequent contributors
appeared to have heeded the call--but their elucidations
did not extend beyond assertions that merchant tonnage
losses translated into losses o-f men, equipment, and
munitions which were not available -for combat in the
ground bat 1 1 e
.
Moreover, the "independent" vs. "joint" distinction
between anti-SLOC and other types o-f naval missions
endured in analysis o-f the Great Patriotic
Uar
—
suggesting that not all parties to the discussion
were convinced that anti-SLOC was either a Joint type o-f
operation or an operation conducted in the service o-f
Joint goal s
.
Inasmuch as Stalbo was the -first to call for a new
approach to analysis to one o-f the problems o-f naval
art, it was appropriate that he be the -first to
undertake the larger e-f-fort devoted to establishing the
comprehensive theoretical and practical relationship
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between the Navy, the other Armed Forces, and military
science as a whole.
Stalbo began his -first article by criticizing the
general -failure to adequately discuss the increased
importance o-f nav^al war -fare since the Navy's equipment
with strategic weapons. The vast growth in the
capabilities o-f modern navies had not been matched,
according to Stalbo, by growth o-f the theory by which
the structure and missions o-f the Navy will be developed
and understood. The subject o-f his theory is a broader
conception o-f that which had earl ier appeared in
February-March 1977
—
the problem o-f demonstrating the
in-fluence o-f a particular naval mission <anti-SLOC) on
continental campaigns.
The subject o-f this theory is naval war-fare in all its
diversity, and its link with armed c on -f 1 i c t in
continental theaters; organizational development o-f
the Navy; and the Navy's preparation and employment
•for repulsing aggression and in peace t i me . 1 1 1
O-f Stalbo's broader subject, only the -first is o-f
concern to us here --the 1 ink of naval war -fare "with
armed con-flict in continental theaters". According to
Stalbo, the development o-f a modern -fleet armed with
nuclear-missile weapons means that the strategic
employment o-f the navy has grown in importance relative
to its operational-tactical level:
...it would be incorrect to seek the primary ways o-f
employing the Navy at the strategic level Cin the
modern era] during the initial period o-f Soviet naval
86
art at a time when the Navy could accompl i sh only
missions at the operat i onal -t ac t
i
cal level and only in
its own coastal regions. 112
Stalbo appears to be concerned to derifonstr ate
something o+ the limits to the theory o-f naval art which
has been derived -from the experience o+ previous wars;
the development o-F an oceanic nuclear-missile armed navy
has sharply increased its strategic s i gn i -f i cance in the
postwar period. "Fundamentally new" developments have
also occurred in the operat i onal -strateg i c sphere, such
as operations aimed at destroying enemy SSBNs, aircra-ft
carriers, and ASUl -Forces, and operations to win
supremacy in an ocean theater o-f operations and -fight on
sea lines o-f commun i cat i on . 1 1 3 j|-,g theory o-f naval
tactics, the -final component o-f the theory o-f naval art,
deals with the conduct o-f naval action, which is "the
primary means -for winning victory". Naval tactics
includes both al 1 -arms and single service actions "(-for
example, submarine -forces in a remote part o-f the ocean
against an enemy convoy )." 1 1 '^
Among the important principles o-f naval strategy
cited by Stalbo in the second hal -f o-f his initial two-
part series was "Seizing and holding the initiative".
Possession o-f the initiative was most e-f-fective when it
was a part o-f o-f-fensive operations conducted Jointly
with the Ground Forces.
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A good example o-f this can be seen in the Black Sea
Fleet''s operation against the enemy's lines o-f
communication between the Crimea and the western shore
o-f the Black Sea. Within a short period o-f time. ..the
-fleet destroyed more than 100 ships and boats and some
40,000 enemy soldiers and o-f -f i cers . 1 1 5
The an t i -SLOC issue per se was clearly not the
central element o-f Stalbo's concerns in these articles.
At least one o-f his -fundamental goals was seemingly to
open up general discussion and reassessment o-f the
significance o-f the Navy based on its development in the
postwar era. The explicit mentions o-f ant i -SLOC actions
noted above were largely illustrative historical
examples o-f well-established aspects o-f Soviet military
theory. One departure -from past practice is worthy o-f
note, however, in that he cited Black Sea Fleet
an t i -SLOC operations as an example o-f "Joint" operations
with the Ground Forces rather than as "independent"--
which may be an indication that Stalbo believes
an t i -SLOC should be re-evaluated in terms more emphatic
o-f the uni-fied goals o-f all the Armed Forces.
Rear Admiral Kostev was the -first to respond to
Stalbo; his article appeared in the November Naval
D i qest . and made several criticisms o-f interest to the
ant i -SLOC debate. First among them was that it was
impossible to study the problems o-f the Navy in
isolation; an integrated approach is required. In
Kostev 's view, Stalbo failed to fully explain the status
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o-f the theory o-f the Navy in terms o-f its position
within the larger -framework o-f a theory o-f the Armed
Forces, which in turn would be subsumed under the still
broader concept o-f Military Science. Naval theory must
examine armed con-fl ict not only at sea but also on the
land and in the air within the framework o-f limits o-f
action by naval -forces. An integrated approach is
necessary to order to determine methods o-f achieving
common goals with other branches o-f the Armed Forces.
KosteVs criticism o-f Stalbo is reminiscent o-f
Stalbo's criticism o-f the anti-SLOC debate in 1977.
Kostev was calling -for less Navy separatism, more
integration o-f Navy theory to the greater body o-f
existing military science, more demonstrated congruence
o-f Navy objectives with the larger goals o-f the other
Armed Forces.
Kostev, however, also believed that it was
super-fluous to argue that some problems o-f war-fare are
spec i -fie to the Navy; each branch oi the Armed Forces
has inherently di-f-ferent -features which require
di-f-ferent development, organization and employment.
War-fare against enemy submarines and sur-face -
combatants in the remote parts o-f the ocean,
interruption and disruption o-f his shipping, and so on
are "purely" naval missions accomplished primarly by
naval f orces ... Under present day conditions each
branch o-f the Armed Forces can exert pressure on the
enemy in practically any geographic medium, but most
e-f -f ec t i ve 1 y and purpose-f u 1 1 y only in the one inherent




then, argues that the current state o-f the
the Theory o-f the Nauy is de-ficient in terms o-f its
integration with other theories o-f the Armed Forces, and
in its -failure to recognize that unique missions are
characteristic o-f each branch of the Armed -forces. Each
mission, nonetheless, must be based upon a thorough
understanding o-f its relationship to the strategic
objecti',^es o-f all types o-f combat as set -forth in the
principles o-f military science.
This opening exchange between Stalbo and Kostew
addresses important elements o-f the recent anti-SLOC
debate, including: The trans-formation o-f the strategic
significance o-f naval war-fare since the Great Patriotic
Uar
,
the development o-f naval theory to de-fine the
relationship between naval warfare and armed conflict in
general, and the status and legitimacy of "independent"
versus "joint" naval operations. In fact, the
antecedents of the TND suggests that it may not be too
much to say that the TND is in part a result of divisive
issues raised and heretofore unresolved in the course of
the anti-SLOC debate.
In January 1982, Admiral Chernavin took up the
issues raised by Admiral Stalbo and critiqued by Admiral
Kostev. Chernavin followed Kostev in noting the
capability of all of the Armed Forces to bring force to
bear on the enemy on land, in the air, and on or under
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the sea, and noted, as did Kostev , that each of the
Armed Forces operates best in its own peculiar-
environment. He likewise called -for the uni-fication o-f
"all knowledge and war fare within the -framework and
limits o-F a single, uni-fied military science." 117
Like Kostev, Chernavin rejected Stalbo's de-finition
o-F "naval strategy" in -favor of that -found in the Soviet
Military Encyclopedia (1976 edition). Stalbo's
de-finition was quite brie-f by comparison to the more
o-f-ficial version, and made no inclusion o-f the joint
character o-f naval combat operations with those o-f the
other Armed Forces. The encyclopedia version, as cited
by Chernavin, reads in part:
Naval strategy is the theory and practice o-f preparing
-for and conducting combat operations with naval
-forces, independently and in collaboration with other
branches o-f the armed -f orces .. .Naval strategy studies
the nature o-f war-fare in sea and ocean theaters o-f
m i 1 i tary operat i ons and deve 1 ops me thods o-f prepar i ng
-for and conducting operations and battles, both
independently and in conjunction with commands
(-forces) o-f other branches o-f the armed -forces. IIS
The rest o-f Chernavin^'s critique made no mention o-f
issues related to the anti-SLOC debate, except to cite
German submarine operations during World War I I as a
historical example o-f the principle o-f "massing o-f
-forces and means"; as the result, the Germans "achieved
great successes" on the Atlantic SLOCs during the period
1941-1942.
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Chernavin's concluding remarks raises the
possibility that the anti-SLOC debate re-flected genuine
uncertainties within the senior military leadership as
to the proper nature and scope o-f anti-SLOC doctrine:
On the whole, debates on Navy theory in the pages o-F
Sou i e t Naval Digest have a great significance, since
from the lack o-f unanimity o-f opinion on many
theoretical problems, serious d i -f -f i cu 1 t i es sometimes
arise in our practical activity. 119
Chernavin's comments on Stalbo's work was overall,
less critical than was Kostev's, but much in the same
line: Naval strategy to date was inadequately
integrated with other theories o-f the Armed Forces and
to the precepts o-f Military Science in general — a charge
similar to that made almost -five years ago by Stalbo
h i mse 1 -f in reference to issues raised in the anti-SLOC
debate
.
Captain 1st Rank Sh 1 om i n provided the next
contribution o-f interest to TND in the April issue o-f
Naval D i oest . The an t i -SLOC m i ss i on is not explicitly
discussed; Sh 1 om i n " s article, however, like those
preceding it in TND, is o-f interest because o-f its -focus
upon issues which have arisen within the context o-f the
anti-SLOC discussion, e.g. the relationship between Navy
missions and the overall goals o-f military combat.
Sh lorn in noted early on that Stalbo "In the main"
correctly emphasized the unity o-f the armed -forces, the
leading role of military science, and the subordinate
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position o-f the theory within it. Nonetheless, his main
criticisms, like those o-f Kostev and Cherna^in above,
were o-f Stalbo's -failure to subsume all elements o-f that
theory to the traditional categories o-f Marxist-Leninist
military thought. For example,
e with the de-finition o-f
c employment o-f the Navy"
cience...in CStalbo's]
ermines the general
the development o-f the
o-f the Navy" . . . CBut] the
Navy, as o-f any other
in the -first pi ace, is
d the m i 1 i tary doc trine
•fed mi 1 i tary strategy
prec i se 1 y m i 1 i tary
e objectives, missions,
oying all the branches o-f
The Navy, according to Sh 1 om i n , is an integral ,
important, component part o-f the Armed Forces.
Historically, "paramount attention" was given to the
Ground Forces, which was quite appropriate under the
circumstances; under modern conditions o-f increased
resources and technology, the importance o-f the Navy has
expanded due to the increase in its capabilities in the
realm o-f both strategic and oper at i onal -tac t i cal
missions. The other branches ot the Armed Forces also
have capabilities to accomplish missions in sea and
oceanic theaters, and the Navy will work in close
cooperation with therri. The scope and character o-f the
development o-f the Navy will be according to the
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requirements of building the Armed Forces as a tghole,
which is a component o-f the unified Soviet military
sc i ence . 1 21
The thrust of Shlomin's remarks is to demonstrate
that all components of a Theory of the Na^;y are and
should be fully consistent with the existing matrix of
Soviet military thought. The structure of military
science subsumes all elements of the Theory of the Navy
to the more comprehensive Theory of the Armed Forces.
From this it follows that all activities and missions of
the Navy are evaluated in terms of their contribution to
the goals of military operations as a whole. Thus the
anti-SLOC mission would not exist outside the unified
context of Soviet military science, "independent"
appellation notwithstanding; anti-SLOC or any other
missions per se are derived from and in accordance with
the same principles upon wh ich all military strategy is
based.
In July, Fleet Admiral Gorshkov summarized and
concluded TND
. His remarks emphasized the subordination
of the theory of the Navy to and its unity with military
science, its interaction with the other theories of the
Armed Forces, and the importance to it of the conceptual
elaboration of joint operations. He also reiterated the
practical importance of theoretical problems, although
not so strongly as did Chernavin:
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A comprehensive examination ot questions o-f the theory
o-f the Navy is necessary to per-fect the practice o-f
its combat employment and, consequently -for improving
combat readiness of the forces as we 1 1 . 1 22
The Great Patriotic War, according to Gorshkov,
remains a valuable source o-f experience -for the
development ot military theory and practice. However,
postwar experience o+' war and combat training "now
prevail in an improvement o-f the conduct o-f military
actions, since they were conducted with the use o-f the
modern physical base ."123 jh^ out-fitting o-f the Navy
with strategic weapons has resulted in an increase in
the Navy's contribution to armed war-fare as a whole;
however, the growth o-f weapons has resulted in the
growth o-f the importance o-f "the unity o-f doctrine and
military strategy in attaining the goals o-f armed
war-fare . " 1 24
Gorshkov ^s contribution was the -final word in TND
.
The ideas he set -forth went unchal 1 enged--an outcome
consistent with his position as CINC Navy, with Russian
cultural values, and with the Marxist-Leninist precept
o-f democratic centralism. As noted above, Gorshkov
emphasized the complete unity and subordination o-f the
theory o-f the Navy with military science, signalled (as
had Chernavin be -fore him) that TND was addressing issues
o-f practical import, indicated that the lessons o-f the
Great Patriotic War experience were giving way to more
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contemporary experience, that the relative importance o-f
the Navy had grown in the postwar years--and that,
nonetheless, all aspects o-f naval combat continued to be
determined by military science.
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^11 . CONCLUSIONS
In -following and commenting upon the course o-f the
anti-SLOC debate since Sea Power o-f the State , it became
clear that analyses o-f the war experience continue to be
a staple o-f Soviet Naval writing, both as an independent
topic and as a prelude to discussion o-f modern problems;
in -fact, discussons o-f modern problems are virtually
never begun without -first establishing the relationship
o-f the current problem with the lessons o-f the war. An
author who is "progressive" about an t i -SLOC operations
during the war tends to be o-f similar mind about
anti-SLOC operations in modern times. Wartime
"conservatives" are o-f ten "progressives" when deal ing
with modern problems. It appears to be a universal
tenet among Soviet Navy writers that SLOCs are at least
as important, but usually more important to the conduct
o-f modern war than was the case in the past.
Both Gorshkov and Stalbo noted during the course o-f
the anti-SLOC debate/Theory o-f the Navy debate that
postwar experience is supplanting that o-f the Great
Patriotic War in the development o-f military theory and
practice. It may be the case that in asserting that the
relevance o-f the war experience was diminishing, either
or both authors were rejecting the "conservative"
position which demanded evidence -for the in-fluence o-f
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an t i -SLOC on the ground campaign (which Stalbo h i mse 1 -f
first vo i ced) -- i nasmuch as there had been no an ti -SLOC
campaigns since the end o-f the war, there was no
empirical data upon which to base such analysis.
Nonetheless, the typology o-f the Great Patriotic War
continues to shape modern historical analysis o-f the
period; -for instance, the 1940 "independent"
c 1 ass i -f i cat i on o-f the Navy's ant i -SLOC mission persisted
at least into the early 1980's, (although not without
rare contradiction, at least by Stalbo).
Throughout the course o-f the debate, Gorshkov
himsel-f was conspicuously the least consistent analyst
o-f the historical and current ranking to be accorded to
an ti -SLOC action. Sea Power o-f the State came -forth
strongly -for the importance o-f such operations then and
now; therea-f ter
,
his many appearances in print presented
a decidedly mixed message involving considerable
variance on the status o-f an ti -SLOC -from one occasion to
another. This phenomenon was probably due to GorshkoVs
status as CINC o-f a service very much in the minority in
numbers and in-fluence at the General Staf-f level 1 22
_
His public statements are in-fluential in de -fining the
public relationship o-f the Navy relative to the other
services, hence are 1 ikely to be under intense review
and pressure -for subordination and strict doctrinal
compliance at the most senior levels o-f Ground
9S
Forces-dominated military leadership. Of all
commentators on anti-SLOC Gorshkov himsel-f, (and other-
senior o-f-ficers like Smirnov) probably has the least
"•freedom o-f speech"
—
the contrast between Gorshkoy's
conciliatory tones and those o-f i^orozov-Kr i v i nskyS? j^
an instructive example.
I -f military doctrine is in transition, subordinate
aspects ohF naval art such as anti-SLOC war-fare are also
likely to be topics o-f wide variation in opinion. Thus
-frequent (albeit unacknowledged) "retrenchments"
(especially by authoritative senior personnel) may also
be necessary. According to McConne 1 1 ^ 23^ jp 197,5 Soviet
doctrine was shi-fting -from a Limited Intercontinental
Option to a Theater Nuclear Option concept vis-a-vis a
major ground war in Europe. The length o-f the
pre-nuc 1 ear period o-f the war, and the duration, scope
and intensity o-f the theater nuclear phase would o-f
course have consequences -for the significance o-f
Atlantic anti-SLOC operations; if General Staff planners
proceeded from an expectation of a brief pre-nuclear
phase, this would imply a downgrading of the importance
of anti-SLOC operations. If there was no strong
consensus of the probability of a short vs. long
pre-nuclear phase, there would be "room" for varying
opinions on the importance of anti-SLOC. Given the
breadth of opinion between the anti-SLOC "progressives"
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and " conserk^at i ves"
,
it may be the case that there was
indeed considerable uncertainty as to the duration o-f
the pre-nuclear conventional period. Until the
uncertainties o-f the transition period were resolved,
the "correct" precedence o-f an t i -SLOC operations within
the context o-f shi-fting military doctrine was probably
also in -flux. This helps to explain the lack o-f
consensus during the period 1975-1981, when the
"progressive" versus "conservative" viewpoints were at
their most extreme contrast.
A similar point could be made -for the watershed
period 19S0-81; as was noted in Chapters IV and V, the
an t i -SLOC debate had greatly diminished in volume and
-frequency -from 1979 to early 1981. One speculative
reason -for this has been mentioned: Navy "progressives"
may have been unable to -forge the theoretical or
practical relationship between an t i -SLOC and the ground
campaign. O-f relevance in this regard, (again according
to McConnel 1 124)
^ in 1980-1981 Soviet military doctrine
was again undergoing a transition. The new doctrine
incorporated a Protracted Conventional War scenario -for
the European theater, wherein extended non-nuclear
campaigns could be anticipated. The relevance and
utility o-f a h i gh-pr i or i ty an t i -SLOC m i ss i on wou 1 d o-f
course grow with the expected duration o-f the land
campaign (as noted at least by both Gorshkov and
100
Sysoyev); thus the admissibility o+ publicly discussing
a high-priority antl-SLOC campaign would be enhanced as
well. The measure o-f its acceptability might be adduced
•from the final anti-SLOC article to be reviewed, wherein
Uice Admiral Gontayeu asserted through the mouths o-f
unat tr i bu ted "-foreign specialists" that "Transoceanic
commun i cat i ons ... have become the most important -factor-
that determines the course and outcome o-f a war in
continental theaters."
The Theory o-f the Navy Debate brought to 1 i gh t an
issue worth remembering in the retrospective survey o-f
an o-f ten convoluted and tendentious discussion; the
debate is far -from being an inconsequential wrangle
among theor i sts--both Admiral Chernavin and Admiral
Gorshkov clearly stated that theoretical shortcomings
hamper the resolution o-f practical problems. In this
case, one o-f the most pressing practical problems was
probably to determine how to best employ the Navy's
major combat arms—submarines and aviation--in
achievilng the overall goals o-f war in the modern era.
Azzarello postulates that the three basic missions
of Naval Pi qest are to -foster unity o-f views, to -furnish
a -forum -for debate, and to disseminate use-ful
i n-format i on
.
125 jfie anti-SLOC debate and the Theory o-f
the Navy debate probably served all three o-f those
missions; it elicited creative theory-building criticism
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-from interested experts, and conveyed the publ ic side o-f
the dispute to the larger pro-f ess i onal audience. The
•final commentary by Gorshkou summed up results and drew
cone 1 us i ons . 1 2.6
Gorsh Rove's remarks express the -final public
position o-f an animated discussion o-f a topic with an
extensii^^e genealogy, and probably represent a statement
oi doctrinal s i gn i -f i cance . Much o-f the Theory o-f the
Navy debate, (certainly those contributions discussed
here)^-^' centered on the issue o-f the relationship
between the principles which determine the theory and
practice o-f naval art and those which determine the
theory and practice o-f the Armed Forces as a whole. All
the contributors cited above gave close attention to
explicating with great emphasis the subordinate, un i -f i ed
character o-f the theory o-f the Navy with the principles
of military science— a task which, it appears, the
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